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 Abstract 
 
The present study extended the literature on escalation bias to group decision-making 
in the context of performance appraisal.  Escalation theory states that persons responsible for 
a hiring decision will provide higher evaluation ratings of that employee than those persons 
not responsible for the decision.  This study compared the performance evaluation decisions 
of supervisors, individual team members, and teams in order to ascertain differences in 
escalation behaviors based on rater perspective and whether the rater was responsible for 
hiring the employee or not.  Support for the hypotheses varied depending on the employment 
decision being made and the perspective of the decision-maker.  There was no support found 
for an escalation of commitment on any of the tested variables.  However, it was found that 
supervisors provided more favorable ratings than teams on the performance and promotability 
variables.  Teams provided more favorable ratings than supervisors on the commission 
decrease variable and more favorable ratings than team members on the layoff and 
commission decrease variables.  Team members provided higher ratings than teams on the 
performance and promotability variables.  Additionally, there was a  perspective by 
responsibility interaction found between teams and team members on the performance and 
vacation days variables, and between supervisors and teams on the vacation days variable.  
No other hypotheses were significant.  Possible effects of polarization in teams and diffusion 
of responsibility by team members are discussed. 
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Introduction/Review of Literature 
Increasingly common in organizations are self-managed and semi-autonomous work 
groups (Brannick, Salas, & Prince, 1997).  The use of teams has become a dominant strategy in 
organizations and is considered by many to be “a cornerstone in modern organizations” 
(Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998, p. 83).  The increased use of teams in organizations is spurred 
by the belief that teams increase organizational effectiveness (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Schrage, 
1995; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993).  Organizational effectiveness is believed to be 
increased by using teams because research indicates the use of teams increases job motivation 
and morale, enhances support for organizational initiatives or programs, and increases the ability 
to share the expertise of members which may be useful in the generation of novel approaches and 
in the avoidance of costly mistakes (Paulus, Larey, & Dzindolet, 2001).  Indeed, Applebaum and 
Blatt (1994) reviewed several studies and concluded there was clear evidence that team-based 
work resulted in improved organizational effectiveness.   
Two functions teams are beginning to serve include making organizational hiring 
decisions and evaluating team member performance, duties that in the past have been typically 
fulfilled by a manager (Brody & Frank, 2002; Liden et al., 1999; Thompson, Kray, & Lind, 
1998).  Because a large portion of the idea generation and decision-making in organizations is 
done within groups or teams (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Paulus et al., 2001), recent research has 
focused on the decision processes of groups and their members.  In particular, the concept of 
escalation bias has been studied with regard to its impact on the decision outcomes of groups.  
Escalation bias refers to the tendency for a decision-maker to become overly committed to an 
ongoing project even in light of negative feedback regarding the project’s performance (Moon, 
2001; Staw, 1976).  
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Historically, escalation bias has been studied in regards to individual and group decisions 
within the context of sunk-costs in financial decisions (Garland, 1990; Staw, 1976; Whyte, 
1993).  More recently, escalation bias has been examined in hiring contexts and in subsequent 
performance evaluations (Bazerman, Beekun, & Schoorman, 1982; Schoorman, 1988).  
However, only one study has analyzed the effects of escalation bias in teams on performance 
evaluations resulting from previous hiring decisions.  Thus, the purpose of the current study was 
to first further extend the literature on escalation bias in decision-making in the performance 
appraisal context to teams, an area which has been largely neglected in previous research on 
escalation bias.  The second purpose was to compare the decisions of supervisors, individual 
team members, and team decisions in an attempt to discern whether there are differences 
between these groups.  Teams are defined as “two or more people with different tasks who work 
together adaptively to achieve specified and shared goals” (Brannick & Prince, 1997, p. 4).  The 
terms team and group often have been used interchangeably, and as such are used synonymously 
throughout this paper.   
This paper first reviews the existing literature on escalation bias in performance 
appraisals.  Next, the literature extending escalation bias in performance appraisal to its effects 
on team decision-making processes is discussed.  An overview of the current study, hypotheses, 
methods and materials are presented.  Finally, the results are presented and discussed, and future 
implications offered. 
Escalation of Commitment 
 Escalation bias refers to the tendency of appraisers to evaluate a project (or an employee) 
more favorably if they took part in the project initiation decision than those who were not part of 
the initial decision, despite negative performance information.  The escalation of commitment to 
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a losing course of action can be seen in a host of naturally occurring situations, including 
gambling (McGlothlin, 1956), waiting at a bus stop (Brockner, Shaw, & Rubin, 1979), and 
making political decisions (Dietz-Uhler, 1996).  Escalation bias has received a great deal of 
research attention in recent years in the context of financial decisions (Garland, 1990; Moon, 
2001; Schaubroeck & Williams, 1993a).  This line of research emerged from Staw’s (1976) 
seminal work on escalated commitment of individuals in financial contexts.   
There are numerous reasons why individuals may escalate their commitment to a course 
of action.  One reason is due to sunk-costs, or the consideration of the amount of time, effort, or 
money already allocated to a project (Garland, 1990; Schaubroeck & Williams, 1993a; Staw, 
1976).  Another reason is due to project completion effects, which refers to an increasing 
unwillingness to abandon a project as it nears completion (Boehne & Paese, 2000; Garland & 
Conlon, 1998; Moon, 2001).  Additionally, justification processes may be present, wherein 
individuals choose to reinvest in a failing course of action in order to “turn the situation around,” 
in hopes of proving to themselves or others that their previous decisions were correct and that 
they are competent (Schaubroeck & Williams, 1993b; Whyte, 1993).  Prospect theory also offers 
a compelling rationale; it suggests that when sunk costs have been incurred toward a losing 
course of action, and these costs still retain economic value or have not been fully deflated, the 
decision-maker will frame subsequent decisions as a choice between losses (Whyte, 1993).  As 
abandoning a project will be a certain loss, escalation will be viewed as possibly increasing 
losses in addition to a chance at avoiding them, and will occur in the hopes that losses will be 
evaded.  Finally, a desire to avoid wastefulness (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), need to demonstrate 
consistency (Staw, 1981), and approach-avoidance conflicts (Rubin & Brockner, 1975) also have 
been offered as explanations for escalation of commitment effects.  While past escalation 
 3
research almost exclusively has focused on participants making initial financial commitments to 
a project and then later making a decision to allocate more funds to the project or to abandon it 
(Schaubroeck & Williams, 1993a, 1993b; Staw, 1976), there is research showing this effect may 
be prevalent among employees charged with making hiring and subsequent performance 
evaluation decisions (Bazerman et al., 1982; Schoorman, 1988).  Research that has investigated 
escalation bias in the context of hiring and evaluation (the focus of this paper) is reviewed below. 
To test for escalation of commitment in the context of performance appraisals, Bazerman 
et al. (1982) randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions, that of either high or low 
responsibility.  All participants assumed the role of the vice-president of a fictional corporation.  
Those assigned to the high responsibility condition attended a session in which they were given 
sets of materials including data on three regional managers from which to make a promotional 
decision.  This included, for example, information on their past sales, earnings, and past 
performance ratings.  They were then asked to choose which manager to promote.  Participants 
in the low responsibility condition received the same sets of material on the three managers, but 
were told someone else had already made the decision regarding whom to promote.  Participants 
in both conditions were then given materials entitled Two Years Later, pertaining to the manager 
they chose (high responsibility) or to the manager who was chosen for them (low responsibility).  
This material consisted of negative information regarding the new director’s performance over 
the last two years.  From this, they evaluated the new director and made decisions regarding 
reward allocation, promotion potential, and future performance.  Results indicated that 
participants who made the initial promotion decision (high responsibility) subsequently gave the 
manager they chose higher pay increases, more vacation days, more positive evaluations, higher 
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forecasted future returns for the director’s region, and were less likely to demote or layoff the 
director than those not responsible for the promotion decision. 
Schoorman (1988) extended the research of Bazerman et al. (1982) by investigating 
escalation effects in performance evaluations within a field setting.  Participants were 
supervisors who evaluated their clerical employees (i.e., secretaries, typists, and administrative 
aides) in a large, public-sector organization.  Schoorman predicted that supervisors who had 
input into, and agreed with, an organization’s decision to promote or hire an employee would 
rate the employee’s performance more positively than those who did not have input into the 
decision (a positive escalation effect).  Further, supervisors who had input into, but disagreed 
with, an organization’s promotion or hiring decision were predicted to rate that employee more 
negatively than those who did not have input into the decision (a negative escalation effect).  
Supervisors who did not have input into the decision to hire the employee being evaluated 
(typically due to a high rate of turnover of supervisors in this company resulting in many 
employees being hired by the previous supervisor) were assumed to exhibit no escalation bias in 
their evaluations.  As predicted, results indicated that those who took part in, and agreed with, 
the hiring decision rated the employee’s performance the most positively (a positive escalation 
effect), followed by those who did not take part in the decision (assumed no effect), followed by 
those who took part in, but disagreed with, the decision (a negative escalation effect).  It should 
be noted that, as there were only 9 of 151 cases constituting the negative escalation condition, 
this effect could be attributed to true differences in employee performance. 
Slaughter et al. (2003) extended the work of Bazerman et al. (1982) and Schoorman 
(1988) by investigating differences in escalation bias due to the relationship between the rater 
and ratee, and due to whether the rater agreed with the hiring decision, disagreed with the 
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decision, or were evaluating a third candidate from which they did not choose.  The study 
employed a 2 × 3 factorial design: rater perspective (team member or supervisor) × 
responsibility (responsible, not responsible-disagree, or not responsible).  This study was 
conducted in two sessions with the first session consisting of all participants making a hiring 
decision between two job candidates based on relevant selection information (e.g., the results of 
a cognitive ability test, a personality inventory, letters of recommendation).  In the second 
session, participants were asked to evaluate the hired candidate’s performance from the past year 
after being given negative information regarding the employee’s performance.  As in previous 
studies, responsibility was manipulated such that those participants in the high responsibility 
group evaluated the candidate they chose to hire in the first session.  Unlike previous studies, the 
low responsibility group was further divided into two conditions such that in one condition, 
participants evaluated the candidate they had previously rejected, and in the other condition, 
participants evaluated a third candidate – a candidate for which they had not seen any previous 
selection materials.  The researchers also manipulated rater perspective, assigning participants to 
one of two conditions: that of a supervisor or that of a team member.   
As with previous studies, Slaughter et al. (2003) investigated the effects of responsibility 
on employee performance, promotability, and the likelihood of performance improvement.  For 
all evaluation decisions, results revealed that, as expected, those participants responsible for the 
hiring decision rated the employee significantly higher than those in the not responsible-disagree 
and not responsible conditions.  In addition, there were no differences observed between the not 
responsible-disagree and the not responsible-other groups on any of the dependent variables, 
suggesting that the biases were due to a positive, rather than negative, escalation effect.  
Additionally, this study hypothesized nondirectional differences between supervisors and team 
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members in their evaluations.  The only significant finding was that supervisors escalated more 
than team members on the promotability measure.  An explanation for this could be that team 
members are competing for the same jobs and therefore are less likely to escalate on this 
performance measure (Slaughter et al., 2003).   
Research generally has demonstrated that when individuals are responsible for a hiring 
decision they tend to increase their commitment to the employee by subsequently evaluating that 
person more favorably than someone not responsible for the hiring decision.  Based on this 
research, the current study hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals responsible for hiring an individual will provide more 
favorable ratings of that individual than those not responsible. 
Individuals vs. Teams 
In looking at escalation bias in teams, Citera, Isaacs, and Berrill-Ross (1999) extended 
Bazerman et al.’s (1982) investigation of escalation effects in performance appraisal by using 
individuals and teams.  Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 6 conditions in a 2 × 3 
factorial design: responsibility (high responsibility or low responsibility) and decision-making 
context (individuals, teams with all members having the same information, or teams with 
members having both the same and different information).  These authors suggested that teams 
spend much of their time discussing information that each member already has instead of sharing 
new information, a problem known as information sampling, which is not relevant to individual 
decision-makers.  Thus, while individuals must only analyze the information to avoid an 
escalation bias, teams must discuss the information all members have as well as pool information 
that is unique to each member in order to make an unbiased decision.  That is, without all of the 
information, the team is less able to make a rational decision.  Thus, it was hypothesized that 
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teams with shared and unshared information should display the greatest amount of escalation 
bias (a less accurate decision) of all three perspectives due to insufficient sharing of information.  
Further, teams with all members having the same information would escalate more than 
individuals because although they have all the information, they were predicted to only discuss 
part of it, thereby resulting in a less rational decision.  As done previously, the researchers also 
proposed that participants in the high responsibility condition would escalate more than those in 
the low responsibility condition across decision-making contexts.   
The Citera et al. (1999) study was conducted in one session, with all participants being 
given information on three job candidates and asked to take the perspective of a vice president in 
a fictional corporation to make a promotion decision regarding these candidates.  Those in the 
high responsibility condition made a promotion decision based on the information regarding 
these candidates and subsequently evaluated their chosen candidate.  Participants in the low 
responsibility condition were given the same information on the three candidates, but were told 
someone else made the promotion decision.  The three candidates were randomly divided among 
the low responsibility condition for evaluation.  Decision-making context was manipulated 
through the amount of information received by participants regarding the promoted employee’s 
performance over the past two years.  Those assigned to the individual condition and to the 
group with shared information were given the employee’s performance data in its entirety to be 
evaluated.  Participants in the group with shared and unshared information were given all of the 
information, but it was divided among the two group members such that members had both 
common and unique information.  Using the same dependent variables as Bazerman et al. 
(1982), this study examined the effects of responsibility and decision context on reward 
allocation (amount of pay increase, number of bonus vacation days, and amount of bonus pay), 
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promotion potential (appropriateness for a demotion and appropriateness for a layoff), and a 
forecast of future performance.  Results indicated a main effect for responsibility in the proposed 
direction on only 1 of the 6 dependent variables, that of demotion decision.  That is, participants 
in the high responsibility condition were less likely to demote the employee than those in the low 
responsibility condition.  Contrary to predictions, individuals were shown to escalate more than 
both types of groups for projected earnings of the employee over the next three months, with this 
being the only significant effect of decision-making context.   
There are several limitations of the Citera et al. (1999) study that may help explain the 
failure to observe many of their hypothesized effects.  First, the groups consisted of only two 
members each, and therefore it is highly plausible that these groups were too small to 
demonstrate previous effects found for information sampling.  Similarly, the failure to observe 
the hypothesized main effect for responsibility on 5 out of the 6 dependent variables may have 
been due to the level of responsibility being similar across conditions.  Citera et al. suggested 
that the unexpected results might have been due to all participants reporting high – though 
statistically different – levels of felt responsibility for the promotion decision, suggesting the 
manipulation was weak.  As such, these results should be interpreted cautiously given the 
limitations associated with the responsibility manipulation and size of the groups. 
Summary of Escalation Bias 
 While research is starting to look at the effects of escalation bias in group decision-
making, the only study that has utilized actual groups to analyze differences in individual and 
group decision-making (Citera et al., 1999) found a significant effect for perspective on only 1 of 
the 6 dependent variables tested, which was in the wrong direction, with groups escalating less 
than individuals.  However, the limitations of the Citera et al. study previously discussed restrict 
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the interpretability and generalizability of their findings.  As stated previously, there are 
numerous reasons why an individual decision-maker might escalate their commitment to a 
previously chosen course of action, yet much is still unknown about when or why groups may 
demonstrate this bias.  As Citera et al. suggest, the assumption cannot be made that groups and 
individuals follow the same processes when making decisions, nor is it safe to assume that a 
group’s decision is simply an average of its members’ decisions.  The current study looks at 
differences between team decision-making processes versus those of individuals, as discussed in 
the following section. 
Team Decision-Making and Escalation of Commitment 
Some research suggests that groups tend to escalate toward a chosen course of action to 
an even greater degree than do individuals, possibly due to group polarization (Whyte, 1993).  
Group polarization occurs when the group’s decision exacerbates the initial decisions of 
individual members, resulting in an evaluation that is more extreme than the average of 
individual decisions (Liden et al., 1999).  However, other research suggests less escalation bias 
in groups, potentially due to group members diffusing the responsibility for the initial decision 
(Whyte, 1991).  Diffusion of responsibility and polarization in groups are discussed below. 
Diffusion of Responsibility.  The diffusion of responsibility hypothesis suggests 
individuals should escalate their commitment more than groups when they are responsible for a 
decision.  This is because, in groups, members are likely to feel less responsible for decision 
outcomes; that is, they diffuse the responsibility for having made the initial decision.  If they feel 
less responsible, they may be less likely to demonstrate escalating behaviors in reaction to poor 
performance feedback, as previously discussed. 
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Whyte (1991) studied the likelihood of decreased escalation tendencies among group 
members who were able to attribute the responsibility of making the decision to initiate a failed 
project to others.  His reasoning was that groups should be less likely to exhibit an escalation of 
commitment to a decision because they can share the blame when their course of action is 
determined to have been a poor decision.  In sharing the blame, group members feel less 
responsible for the poor decision than if they had made the decision on their own.  To test this, 
participants in a laboratory study were each given three scenarios describing escalation situations 
(i.e., conditions involving a financial loss in a course of action wherein participant evaluation 
decisions can either reverse or exacerbate the initial losses).  For each scenario, individuals were 
asked to make a decision of whether to withdraw from, or increase, financial commitment to the 
project.  They were told that an increase in investment funds could turn the project around, but it 
was more likely that this would be in vain, with a projected null return on investment (the funds 
already allocated would represent a loss).  Responsibility was manipulated in three ways: 
participants were assigned to the 1) no responsibility control condition in which they were told 
someone else had made the decision to initiate the project and their duty was only to decide 
(individually) whether or not to continue with the course of action; 2) individual-responsibility 
condition in which they were told they were solely responsible for the initial decision; or 3) the 
group-responsibility condition, wherein participants were described as being part of a group who 
shared the responsibility of making the decision to pursue the given course of action.  Note, 
participants were not actually placed in groups, but rather were told they had participated with 
others to make the project initiation decision.  As such, all participants made individual decisions 
regarding whether to continue or withdraw from the project.  Results indicated participants in the 
individual-responsibility condition were more likely than those in the group condition to escalate 
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commitment to the project, to invest more resources, and to take more risks (assessed by asking 
participants what was the maximum risk they were willing to accept for investing additional 
funds toward the project) in order to turn around the failing project.  Group members, in turn, 
were more likely to escalate commitment, invest more funds, and take greater risks than those in 
the no-responsibility control condition.  Group membership thereby resulted in diminished 
occurrence and degree of escalation behaviors, not the elimination of such behaviors.  Again, it is 
important to note that the unit of analysis was the individual, as individuals were never placed in 
groups. 
Polarization.  Despite the evidence found for a diffusion of responsibility effect, prior 
research also has shown that team decisions tend to be more extreme than the average of 
individual decisions of the team members, constituting a polarization effect (Liden et al., 1999; 
Tindale, 1993; Whyte, 1993; Zaleska & Kogan, 1971).  This may seem counterintuitive because, 
as stated earlier, team members who can obscure their role in the decision-making process might 
individually feel less responsible (Rao & Monk, 1999).  A condition of low responsibility would 
be predicted to result in the team’s decision being less extreme than that of an individual 
decision-maker.  Yet there are many forces within the team that may act oppositely to the effects 
of diffused responsibility.  A social-value interpretation of the escalation of commitment 
suggests there is greater social value associated with risk than with caution (escalating being 
riskier than not escalating), which is the main determinant of risky behaviors in teams (Jones & 
Roelofsma, 2000; Zaleska & Kogan, 1971).  Thus, persons who are more conservative in their 
decisions than team members are motivated by the presence of team members toward the more 
socially valued, risky behaviors (e.g., more extreme ratings, larger financial investments).  As 
discussion within the team continues, the decision becomes riskier and riskier.  According to this 
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theory, the social value of risk is more prominent in teams than with individuals because 
individual attitudes, judgments, and behaviors change as a result of the actual or implied 
presence of others (Jones & Roelofsma, 2000). 
In addition to the social-value theory of team escalation bias, there are several other 
determinants of risky behaviors in groups that have been observed.  One example is the 
phenomenon of groupthink, which refers to a faulty decision-making process that leads to “a 
deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgments as a result of group 
pressures” (Janis, 1971, p. 44).  As such, groups might be predicted to escalate more than 
individuals due to pressures for uniformity, overconfidence in the group’s invulnerability and 
past judgments, and stereotyped views of those outside of the group who may be seen as a threat 
to the group’s positive image (Janis, 1972; Kameda & Sugimori, 1993; Turner & Horvitz, 2001).  
Another reason groups may be expected to escalate more than individuals is due to group 
solidarity, or a desire to maintain unity and to preserve a positive image of the group, protecting 
its identity (Turner & Horvitz, 2001).  In an effort to maintain unity and a shared positive view of 
the group’s functioning, individual group members may be less likely to express an opposing 
opinion, leading to irrational decision-making if the perceived group preference is for a biased 
decision.  One final reason for an increase in escalation behaviors by groups may be due to the 
condition of psychological entrapment, or an increase in commitment to a chosen course of 
action in order to justify prior investments (Kameda & Sugimori, 1993).  Kameda and Sugimori 
argued that group entrapment is distinct from individual entrapment because in groups there is 
more invested than just physical costs of time and money, such as social and interpersonal 
outcomes associated with discontinuing the chosen course of action (e.g., group members 
“saving face,” violating group harmony).   
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Indeed, there have been many instances in which the terms groupthink, entrapment, and 
escalation of commitment have been used to describe the same political blunders (e.g., the Bay of 
Pigs, Watergate, the escalation of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War; Kameda & 
Sugimori, 1993; Raven, 1998; Street & Anthony, 1997).  Jones and Roelofsma (2000) also cite 
many parallels between groupthink, group polarization, and group escalation of commitment 
biases, such as their assertion that all three biases stem from social influence factors.  The only 
study found looking at polarization effects with respect to performance evaluations is discussed 
below. 
As previously stated, group polarization occurs when the perspective of individuals is 
intensified due to the group’s discussion (Jones & Roelofsma, 2000).  Liden et al. (1999) 
attempted to assess for polarization effects in their study comparing the disciplinary decisions of 
managers, group members, and groups.  Individual managers and individual group members 
were each asked to respond to eight scenarios describing a hypothetical group member’s poor 
performance (i.e., tardiness, not listening, poor quality, and made a mistake) by indicating the 
disciplinary action they would take.  Individual group members then formed actual groups 
(averaging 5.6 members) and together reached consensus on the disciplinary action for each of 
the same eight scenarios (group perspective).  As hypothesized, results indicated that managerial 
decisions were more severe than those of group members, but not more severe than those of 
groups after consensus.  The authors reasoned that managers may be more severe than group 
members due to a greater social distance between the two groups.  However, when group 
members come together to make decisions, social distances may be increased between the 
members and the poor performer, leading the group to evaluate the employee similarly to 
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managers.  Also, it was observed that groups made more severe disciplinary decisions than their 
individual members, attributed to polarization effects within the group. 
Although there has been little research on escalation behaviors of teams in the 
performance appraisal context, Liden et al. (1999) found that supervisors tend to make more 
severe disciplinary decisions than individual group members (Liden et al.). This may be due to 
team members being less willing to allocate unfavorable ratings to peers for fear of “rocking the 
boat” (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995, p. 141), or due to peers being uncomfortable in their 
evaluative roles (Murphy & Cleveland), at least with regard to making disciplinary decisions.  
On the other hand, peers may be less willing to escalate (providing more accurate appraisals) 
because the peer’s performance affects the performance of the team (Slaughter et al., 2003). 
As Murphy and Cleveland (1995) point out, supervisors may manipulate ratings to 
accomplish personal goals, such as when the performance of subordinates influences how they as 
supervisors are evaluated, to achieve organizational goals (Kozlowski, Chao, & Morrison, 1998), 
or to protect and enhance their best subordinates’ careers (Longenecker, Sims, & Gioia, 1987).  
As Bretz, Milkovich, and Read (1992) state, supervisors view fairness over accuracy as the most 
vital issue in performance appraisal.  Indeed, Slaughter et al. (2003) observed that supervisors 
escalated (were more lenient) to a greater extent than team members on the promotability 
variable.  This effect may be due to persons described as supervisors demonstrating more felt 
responsibility than persons described as being part of a team, or actually placed in a team to 
make evaluation decisions.   
Research suggests that different rater sources (perspectives) tend to provide different 
ratings of a target (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995) and as such, based on the rationale presented 
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above, differences were predicted in the current study.  The current study hypothesized rater 
perspective would influence performance evaluations. 
Hypothesis 2: Rater perspective will influence performance evaluations. 
Hypothesis 2a: Participants in the supervisor condition will provide more favorable 
ratings than teams. 
Hypothesis 2b: Participants in the supervisor condition will provide more favorable 
ratings than team members. 
 Hypothesis 2c: Teams will provide higher ratings than team members.  
As other studies of escalation bias typically have used only the supervisor condition, 
differences between perspectives due to the effects of responsibility may be expected when 
extending this research to teams.  For example, a team may demonstrate a stronger escalation 
effect than its members due to its members diffusing the responsibility of the decision prior to 
group discussion, and then, after discussion, becoming polarized with regard to the previous 
decision, thus continuing to invest in the peer who is performing poorly.  Based on the past 
research showing interactions on some evaluation decisions (Citera et al., 1999; Slaughter et al., 
2003), the current study suggested there would be differential effects of responsibility across 
perspectives. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a responsibility by rater perspective interaction.  
Hypothesis 3a: Supervisors will escalate to a greater degree than teams. 
Hypothesis 3b: Supervisors will escalate to a greater degree than individual team 
members. 
Hypothesis 3c: Teams will escalate to a greater degree than team members. 
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Method 
Participants 
A power analysis was conducted to determine how many participants were necessary to 
appropriately test the hypotheses.  Using an alpha of .05, effect size of .25 (medium), and power 
of .80, results indicated approximately 216 data points would be needed, or 36 per cell (see 
design below), resulting in a need for 72 four-person teams (with the same persons comprising 
the individual team member condition), and an additional 72 individual participants comprising 
the supervisor condition.  Thus, participants were 424 undergraduate students enrolled at 
Louisiana State University who received extra credit for their voluntary participation.  Ninety-
three of these participants comprised the supervisor perspective, while 331 comprised the team 
member perspective.  The team members were also placed in groups to form the team 
perspective, making up 72 teams with an average of 4.6 persons per team.  The sample of 
supervisors was 81.7% female, with a mean age of 21.48 years (SD = 4.48).  Most of these were 
currently employed part-time (65.6%), with 23.9% currently employed full-time.  The teams and 
team members were 71.0% female, with a mean age of 20.98 years (SD = 3.47).  Like the 
supervisors, the majority of team members were employed part-time at the time of the study 
(70.1%), with 11.0% working full-time.  Also, a great many of the team members (89.4%) had 
previous experience working in teams.  Finally, participants in the supervisor condition reported 
similar past experience with hiring decisions, evaluating performance, and working as managers 
(40.9%, 34.4%, and 22.6%, respectively) as compared to the participants in the team and team 
member conditions (39.0%, 33.2%, and 23.6%, respectively). 
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Design 
This study employed a 2 × 3 (responsibility × perspective) factorial design.  
Responsibility was manipulated such that in one condition, participants evaluated the candidate 
they chose to hire (responsible condition), and in the second condition they evaluated a candidate 
chosen for them (not responsible).  Perspective was manipulated such that participants either 
made the hiring and evaluation decisions by themselves as supervisors (supervisor condition), or 
hired as a team, evaluated by themselves (team member condition), then met as a team again to 
reach consensus on the evaluation decisions (team condition).   
Stimulus Materials 
 The stimulus materials (i.e., scenarios) were adapted from Slaughter et al. (2003), with 
changes made due to adding the team perspective, and with one sentence added at the end of the 
team-responsible scenario reminding the participant of their perspective (see Appendix A).  The 
scenarios described a fictional company for which the participant works as either a supervisor or 
as a team member.  The first set of stimulus materials described the organization and the 
participant’s duties within this company, which include hiring (for those in the responsible 
condition) and evaluating sales personnel.  Information regarding two job candidates from whom 
the participants were asked to make a hiring decision, or whom the participants were told 
someone else was going to make the hiring decision, were found in two folders that accompanied 
the scenario.  Inside each folder were letters of recommendation, scores from intelligence, 
integrity, and personality tests, and a summary of test results (see Appendices B and C).  The 
second set of materials contained a second scenario informing participants who was hired (by 
themselves or their team, or by Human Resources), and describing this person’s less than optimal 
performance over the last year.  A folder corresponding to the candidate who was hired was 
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presented which included their annual sales evaluation summary and customer comment cards 
(see Appendices D and E).   
Measures 
 All measures are described below and items may be found in Appendix F. 
Performance was measured with three items, each rated on a 7-point scale of agreement 
(1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).  An example item is, “Overall, this employee 
contributed to the success of the team.”  These are the same items used by Slaughter et al. 
(2003).  The items demonstrated an internal consistency reliability estimate of α = .85. 
Promotability was measured with three items on a 7-point scale of likelihood (1 = highly 
unlikely to 7 = highly likely).  An example item is, “Likelihood of this employee being promoted 
within the next year.”  Slaughter et al. (2003) used only this one item to measure promotability.  
As one item tends to be unreliable, the present study added two more items.  These demonstrated 
an internal consistency reliability estimate of α = .95. 
Performance improvement was also rated with three items on a 7-point scale of 
likelihood (1 = highly unlikely to 7 = highly likely).  An example item is, “Likelihood of 
improving performance next year.”  As with the promotability variable, Slaughter et al. (2003) 
used only this one item to measure performance improvement.  Two additional items were 
added, with a total internal consistency reliability estimate of α = .92. 
Pay increase was measured with one item asking participants, “How large, if any, of a 
pay increase would you give this employee (i.e., how much would you increase his pay over the 
previous year’s salary)?  The company average is 10% annually.”  This is the same item used by 
Bazerman et al. (1982), Citera et al. (1999), and Slaughter et al. (2003). 
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Vacation days were measured with one item asking participants, “How many, if any, 
bonus vacation days in the upcoming year would you give to this employee? (0-4).”  This item 
was also used by Bazerman et al. (1982), Citera et al. (1999), and Slaughter et al. (2003). 
Likelihood of probation was measured with one item asking the participant, “If you were 
told to make a decision at this moment, would you put this employee on probation? (Yes/No).”  
This item was adapted from Slaughter et al. (2003). 
Likelihood of layoff was measured with one item asking the participant, “If you were told 
to make a decision at this moment, would you fire this employee? (Yes/No).”  This item was 
adapted from Slaughter et al. (2003). 
 Commission decrease was measured with one item asking the participant, “How much, if 
any, would you lower this employee’s percentage of commissions? (1 = not at all to 7 = as much 
as possible).”  This item has not previously been used. 
Procedure 
Consistent with Bazerman et al. (1982) and Citera et al. (1999), data was collected during 
one session.  The informed consent of all participants was obtained.  Participants assigned to the 
supervisor condition read a scenario identifying them as a supervisor in a fictional organization.  
Responsibility was manipulated such that participants in the responsible condition were asked to 
make a hiring decision between two candidates and then evaluated the candidate they chose to 
hire.  Participants in the not responsible condition were given the same stimulus materials on the 
two candidates, but were told someone else has already made the hiring decision.  All those in 
the supervisor condition read scenarios describing the employee’s poor performance over the last 
year from which they were asked to make various performance evaluations and associated 
performance decisions.  They then evaluated the candidate.  Rather than equally dividing the two 
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candidates among the not responsible participants, these participants evaluated the candidates in 
proportion to the rate at which each candidate was chosen by the responsible participants.   
Participants assigned to the team member and team conditions read a scenario identifying 
them as a team member in a fictional organization and, as in the supervisor condition, were 
asked to make a hiring decision between the same two candidates as participants in the 
supervisor condition (responsible), or were told someone else made the hiring decision (not 
responsible).  In the responsible condition, the team, consisting of 4 to 6 members, made the 
hiring decision as a group by consensus.  Next, participants read the same scenarios describing 
the employee’s poor performance over the last year from which they then evaluated the 
employee.  Team members first evaluated the employee individually, then came together for a 
second time and reached consensus on each of the evaluation items.  Again, not responsible 
participants evaluated the candidates in proportion to the rate at which each candidate was 
chosen by the responsible participants. All participants completed a demographic and 
background questionnaire (see Appendix G) and were debriefed at the end of the session.  
Manipulation Checks 
Perspective was measured with one item reading, “Based on the scenarios you read, you 
were asked to assume which of the following working relationships with the person you 
evaluated? (a) Supervisor; (b) Team member.”  This item was adapted from Slaughter et al. 
(2003; see Appendix H for manipulation items).  For participants in the supervisor condition, 
88.2% passed this manipulation check, or said that they were the employee’s supervisor.  Of the 
participants in the team member condition, 82.4% passed, or saw themselves as the employee’s 
team member.  Finally, 97.2% of those in the team condition correctly identified themselves as 
being part of the employee’s team. 
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Responsibility was measured with one item reading, “Based on the scenarios you read, 
who was responsible for hiring the employee you evaluated?  (a) I was; (b) My group was; (c) 
Human Resources; (d) I don’t know.”  In the supervisor condition, 97.8% of participants who 
were responsible for the hiring decision correctly identified themselves as being responsible.  Of 
those supervisors not responsible for the hiring decision, 76.6% correctly identified Human 
Resources as being responsible for the hiring decision.  For participants in the team member 
condition, 90.4% of those responsible for the hiring decision passed this manipulation, or stated 
they were responsible.  For those team member participants who were not responsible for the 
hiring decision, 60.0% correctly stated Human Resources made the hiring decision.  Many of 
these participants (22.4%) stated they did not know who hired the employee, and 15.8% stated 
their group was responsible.  Lastly, for participants in the team condition, 100% of those 
responsible for the hiring decision stated they were the ones who hired the employee.  For those 
teams not responsible for the hiring decision, 88.9% accurately identified Human Resources as 
responsible for hiring the employee. 
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Results 
 As the team and team member conditions were comprised of the same participants 
(making analyses between the two within-subject), and supervisors were persons not 
participating in either other condition (making analyses between supervisors and either teams or 
team members between-subject), three separate analyses were run for all dependent variables 
(DVs) or sets of DVs1.  For the purpose of testing the effects of responsibility (made the hiring 
decision or not) and rater perspective (supervisor, team member or team) on the participant’ 
evaluations of the ratee’s performance, likelihood of performance improvement, and 
promotability, a between-subjects multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was first run 
between supervisors and team members.  Responsibility and perspective were the independent 
variables (IVs), with the order of the DVs being performance, likelihood of improvement, and 
promotability.  With the use of Wilks’ criterion, this analysis indicated no significant main 
effects of perspective, responsibility, or of the perspective x responsibility interaction on the 
combined DVs, F(3, 418) = .66, ns, F(3, 418) = 1.00, ns, and F(3, 418) = 1.11, ns, respectively.   
There was no support for hypotheses 1, 2b or 3b in this analysis.  (See Table 1 for a summary of 
the hypotheses and significant findings, and Tables 2 and 3 for means and standard deviations.)   
 A second between-subjects MANOVA was run between supervisors and teams on the 
same three DVs as previously run, entered in the same order.  This analysis indicated a 
significant main effect of perspective on the combined DVs, F(3, 159) = 5.75, p < .01.  Further 
investigation revealed a significant effect of perspective on the performance variable, F(1, 161) = 
5.94, p < .05, η2 = .04, and on the promotability variable, F(1, 161) = 12.77, p < .01, η2 = .07.  
                                                 
1 Correlation tests were run between teams and team members on the performance, likelihood of improvement, and 
promotability variables to ascertain if these two groups were significantly different, allowing the use of only between-
subjects MANOVAs and ANOVAs to test all hypotheses.  Team and team member responses, however, were 
significantly, moderately correlated on all three variables.  Thus, separate MANOVAs and ANOVAs were used.  
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Supervisors rated the employee higher than teams on performance (M = 3.48, SD = 1.06, and M 
= 3.09, SD = 1.03, respectively), and on promotability (M = 2.73, SD = 1.16, and M = 2.14, SD = 
.91, respectively), showing support for hypotheses 2 and 2a.  The analysis showed no significant 
effects of responsibility or of the perspective x responsibility interaction on the combined DVs, 
F(3, 159) = 1.15, ns, and F(3, 159) = 2.05, ns, respectively.  There was no support demonstrated 
in this analysis for hypotheses 1, 3 or 3a. 
To test the effects of responsibility (a between-subjects factor) and perspective (a within-
subjects factor) of team members and teams on the performance, likelihood of improvement, and 
promotability variables, three mixed-model analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were run.  The first 
ANOVA, run on the performance variable, showed no significant effect of responsibility on 
teams and team members, F(1, 70) = 1.49, ns.  There were significant effects of perspective, F(1, 
70) = 11.79, p < .01, η2 = .14, in the opposite direction hypothesized, and of the perspective x 
responsibility interaction, F(1, 70) = 8.65, p < .01, η2 = .11.  That is, team members (M = 3.41, 
SD = .50) rated the employee’s performance higher than did teams (M = 3.09, SD = 1.03), and 
this effect was of greater magnitude for those responsible for the hiring decision.  There was 
support for hypotheses 2 and 3, but not for hypotheses 1, 2c, or 3c.  The second mixed-model 
ANOVA, run on likelihood of improvement variable, demonstrated no significant effects of 
perspective, F(1, 70) = .04, ns, responsibility, F(1, 70) = .67, ns, or the perspective x 
responsibility interaction, F(1, 70) = .01, ns, showing no support for hypotheses 1, 2c or 3c.  The 
final mixed-model ANOVA, which was run on the promotability variable, showed a significant 
effect of perspective, F(1, 70) = 19.58, p < .001, η2 = .22, in opposition to what was 
hypothesized in 2c.  That is, team members (M = 2.55, SD = .56) were significantly more likely 
to promote the employee than were teams (M = 2.14, SD = .91).  This analysis yielded no  
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 Table 2 
 
Between-Subject Results 
 
 Decision-Making Context 
 Supervisors Team Members Teams 
Dependent 
Variable Responsibility     M     SD    M     SD    M    SD 
High 3.55 1.04 3.38 1.04 3.32 1.05Overall 
Performance None 3.42 1.08 3.44 1.07 2.85 .96
High 4.29 1.11 4.20 1.21 4.16 1.42Likelihood of 
Improvement None 4.09 1.23 4.01 1.36 3.99 1.37
High 2.93 1.22 2.56 1.07 2.06 .85Promotability None 2.53 1.08 2.55 1.12 2.22 .96
High 3.50 2.89 4.13 3.01 4.71 2.75Pay Increase None 4.59 3.20 4.27 3.38 4.56 2.90
High 1.15 .87 1.25 .90 1.39 .90Bonus Vacation 
Days None 1.36 1.09 1.22 .97 .97 .74
High 1.41 .50 1.45 .50 1.47 .51Probation None 1.49 .51 1.45 .50 1.39 .49
High 1.96 .21 1.90 .30 1.97 .17Layoff None 1.94 .25 1.93 .26 2.00 .00
High 1.62 2.27 1.47 2.68 1.24 4.22Commission 
Decrease None 2.00 3.30 2.16 4.93 .51 1.04
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 Table 3 
 
Within-Subject Results 
 
 Decision-Making Context 
 Team Members Teams 
Dependent 
Variable Responsibility    M    SD   M    SD 
High 3.37 .45 3.32 1.05 Overall 
Performance None 3.45 .54 2.85 .96 
High 4.20 .63 4.16 1.42 Likelihood of 
Improvement None 4.00 .65 3.99 1.37 
High 2.55 .58 2.06 .85 Promotability None 2.55 .54 2.22 .96 
High 4.17 1.48 4.71 2.75 Pay Increase None 4.26 1.45 4.56 2.90 
High 1.24 .42 1.39 .90 Bonus 
Vacation Days None 1.22 .50 .97 .74 
High 1.44 .23 1.47 .51 Probation None 1.45 .23 1.39 .49 
High 1.90 .17 1.97 .17 Layoff None 1.93 .13 2.00 .00 
High 1.46 1.25 1.24 4.22 Commission 
Decrease None 2.20 2.70 .51 1.04 
Note: Two tables are used to depict the means and standard deviations because in the between-
subjects analyses using team members, each team member rating was allowed to be an 
independent observation (or n = 331), while in the within-subjects analyses using team members, 
an average of each teams’ members’ ratings was taken for each variable (or n = 72), allowing 
this score to be compared to the team score.  Means and standard deviations presented are from 
the first set of analyses, prior to removal of subjects not passing the manipulation checks. 
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 significant effects of responsibility, F(1, 70) = .27, ns, or of the perspective x responsibility 
interaction, F(1, 70) = .72, ns, showing no support for hypotheses 1 or 3c. 
 To test the effects of responsibility and perspective on the percentage of pay increase 
raters allocated to the employee, 3 separate ANOVAs were conducted.  A between-subjects 
factorial ANOVA was run between supervisors and team members on the pay increase variable, 
indicating no significant effects of perspective, F(1, 419) = .18, ns, responsibility, F(1, 419) = 
2.71, ns, or the perspective x responsibility interaction, F(1, 419) = 1.62, ns.  Thus, there was no 
support for hypotheses 1, 2b or 3b.  A second between-subjects ANOVA was run between 
supervisors and teams on percentage of pay increase, again indicating no significant effect for 
perspective, F(1, 161) = 1.58, ns, responsibility, F(1, 161) = 1.02, ns, or for the perspective x 
responsibility interaction, F(1, 161) = 1.77, ns, showing no support for hypotheses 1, 2a or 3a.  
Finally, a within-subjects factorial ANOVA was run between team members and teams on the 
pay variable.  There was no significant effect of responsibility between teams and team 
members, F(1, 70) = .01, ns, of perspective within teams and team members, F(1, 70) = 2.11, ns, 
or of the responsibility x perspective interaction, F(1, 70) = .17, ns.  No support for hypotheses 1, 
2c or 3c was found for the pay variable. 
 To test the effects of responsibility and rater perspective on number of vacation days 
allocated by the raters, a between-subjects factorial ANOVA was first run between supervisors 
and team members.  This analysis showed no significant effects of perspective, F(1, 420) = .04, 
ns, responsibility, F(1, 420) = .71, ns, or the perspective x responsibility interaction, F(1, 420) = 
1.09, ns.  Thus, there was no support for hypotheses 1, 2b or 3b.  A between-subjects factorial 
ANOVA between supervisors and teams also showed no significant effects of perspective, F(1, 
161) = .28, ns, or responsibility, F(1, 161) = .51, ns.  However, the perspective x responsibility 
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 interaction was significant, F(1, 161) = 4.70, p < .05, η2 = .03, showing responsibility had 
differential effects on supervisors and teams.  Teams who were responsible for the hiring 
decision (M = 1.39, SD = .90) gave the employee more vacation days than did supervisors who 
were responsible for the hiring decision (M = 1.15, SD = .87), while teams not responsible for the 
hiring decision (M = .97, SD = .74) allocated less vacation days to the employee than did 
supervisors who were not responsible (M = 1.36, SD = 1.09).  As teams escalated to a greater 
extent than did supervisors due to responsibility, hypotheses 3a failed, as well as hypotheses 1 
and 2a.  Finally, a within-subjects factorial ANOVA was run between teams and team members 
on the vacation variable.  This analysis indicated no main effect of perspective, F(1, 70) = .42, 
ns, or of responsibility, F(1, 70) = 2.52, ns, showing no support for hypotheses 1 or 2.  Again, the 
perspective x responsibility interaction was significant, F(1, 70) = 6.66, p < .05, η2 = .09.  Of 
those persons responsible for the hiring decision, teams (M = 1.39, SD = .90) allocated more 
vacation days than did team members (M = 1.24, SD = .42), supporting hypothesis 3c; of those 
not responsible for the hiring decision, team members (M = 1.22, SD = .50) allocated more 
vacation days to the employee than did teams (M = .97, SD = .74).   
 A between-subjects factorial ANOVA was run between supervisors and team members 
on whether the raters would place the employee being evaluated on probation.  This analysis 
showed no significant effects of perspective, responsibility or the perspective x responsibility 
interaction, F(1, 420) = .00, ns, F(1, 420) = .53, ns, and F(1, 420) = .33, ns, respectively.  There 
was no support for hypotheses 1, 2b or 3b.  A second between-subjects factorial ANOVA was 
run between supervisors and teams on the probation variable.  Again, this showed no significant 
effects of perspective, responsibility, or the perspective x responsibility interaction, F(1, 161) = 
.07, ns, F(1, 161) = .00, ns, and F(1, 161) = 1.03, ns, respectively.  There was no support for 
 29
 hypotheses 1, 2a or 3a.  Finally, a within-subjects factorial ANOVA was run on teams and team 
members on the probation variable.  This analysis showed no significant effects of perspective, 
F(1, 70) = .12, ns, of responsibility, F(1, 70) = .24, ns, or of the perspective x responsibility 
interaction, F(1, 70) = .86, ns.  There was no support for hypotheses 1, 2c or 3c for the probation 
DV. 
 A between-subjects factorial ANOVA was run between supervisors and team members 
on evaluator’s desire to fire the employee being evaluated.  This analysis yielded no significant 
effects of perspective, responsibility, or of the perspective x responsibility interaction, F(1, 420) 
= 1.13, ns, F(1, 420) = .02, ns, and F(1, 420) = .61, ns, respectively.  There was no support for 
hypotheses 1, 2b or 3b for this variable.  A between-subjects factorial ANOVA was run between 
supervisors and teams on the layoff variable.  This analysis likewise showed no significant 
effects of perspective, responsibility, or of the perspective x responsibility interaction, F(1, 161) 
= 1.81, ns, F(1, 161) = .02, ns, and F(1, 161) = .66, ns, respectively.  There was no support for 
hypotheses 1, 2a or 3a for the layoff variable.  Lastly, a within-subjects factorial ANOVA was 
run between teams and team members on this variable.  The within-subjects analysis revealed no 
significant effects of responsibility or of the perspective x responsibility interaction, F(1, 70) = 
1.11, ns, and F(1, 70) = .01, ns, respectively.  There was a significant effect of perspective, F(1, 
70) = 21.27, p < .01, η2 = .23.  That is, teams (M = 1.99, SD = .12) showed more lenience, or 
were significantly less likely to fire the employee than were team members (M = 1.91, SD = .15).  
There was support for hypothesis 2c, but not for hypotheses 1 or 3c for the rater’s decision to fire 
this employee. 
 The last DV tested was the percentage of commission decrease participants gave to the 
employee.  The first between-subjects factorial ANOVA, between supervisors and team 
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 members, showed no main effects of perspective, F(1, 414) = .00, ns, or of responsibility, F(1, 
414) = 1.47, ns, and no significant perspective x responsibility interaction, F(1, 414) = .13, ns.  
There was no support for hypotheses 1, 2b or 3b.  A between-subjects factorial ANOVA between 
supervisors and teams on the commission decrease DV showed a significant effect of 
perspective, F(1, 161) = 4.09, p < .05, η2 = .03, in the opposite direction.  Teams rated the 
employee higher on this variable (M = .88, SD = 3.08) than did supervisors (M = 1.81, SD = 
2.83).   In other words, teams decreased the employee’s rate of commission to a lesser extent 
than did supervisors.  This analysis showed no significant effects of responsibility or of the 
perspective x responsibility interaction, F(1, 161) = .15, ns, and F(1, 161) = 1.43, ns, 
respectively.  There was no support for hypotheses 1, 2a or 3a.  Finally, a within-subjects 
factorial ANOVA was run on teams and team members to ascertain differences on the 
commission decrease variable.  This analysis also showed no significant effects of responsibility 
or of the perspective x responsibility interaction, F(1, 70) = .00, ns, and F(1, 70) = 3.66, ns.  The 
analysis did show a significant effect of perspective, F(1, 70) = 6.16, p < .05, in the hypothesized 
direction.  With regard to the commission variable, teams rated the employee higher (M = .88, 
SD = 3.08) – or lowered his commission to a lesser extent – than did team members (M = 1.83, 
SD = 2.12), showing support for hypotheses 2c.  There was no support for hypotheses 1 or 3c. 
 Finally, as many participants did not pass the manipulation checks, and the responsibility 
manipulation in particular appeared weak (recall that only 60% of team members who were not 
responsible for the hiring decision correctly identified Human Resources as being responsible), 
each analysis was run a second time after removing all participants who did not pass the 
manipulation checks.  In these analyses, there were no longer any significant interactions found 
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 (see Table 4).  Additionally, there were still no significant effects found for responsibility.  There 
were many significant effects found for perspective, however.   
In the between-subjects MANOVA between supervisors and team members on the 
performance, likelihood of improvement, and promotability variables, while there was no overall 
significant effect of perspective, significant effects were found for performance, F(1, 279) = 
4.30, p < .05, η2 = .02, and for promotability, F(1, 279) = 4.22, p < .05, η2 = .02.  Specifically, 
supervisors rated the employee higher than team members on both the performance variable (M 
= 3.58, SD = 1.11, and M = 3.29, SD = 1.01, respectively), and on the promotability variable (M 
= 2.78, SD = 1.21, and M = 2.45, SD = 1.04, respectively), supporting hypotheses 2 and 2b.  
These results are unique from the initial MANOVA on these variables. 
In the second between-subjects MANOVA between supervisors and teams, there was a 
significant effect of perspective on the combined DVs, F(3, 130) = 5.40, p < .01.  Again, there 
were significant effects found for the performance, F(1, 132) = 6.07, p < .05, η2 = .04, and for 
promotability, F(1, 132) = 9.64, p < .01, η2 = .07.  Specifically, supervisors rated the employee 
higher than teams on both the performance variable (M = 3.58, SD = 1.11, and M = 3.14, SD = 
1.03, respectively), and on the promotability variable (M = 2.78, SD = 1.21, and M = 2.18, SD = 
.90, respectively), supporting hypotheses 2 and 2a.  These were the same results found in the 
initial MANOVA between supervisors and teams. 
Three mixed-model ANOVAs were run again to test for differences between teams and 
team members on the performance, likelihood of improvement, and promotability variables.  The 
only significant effect found was on the promotability variable, F(1, 64) = 4.74, p < .05, η2 = .07, 
in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized.  That is, team members (M = 2.40, SD = .66) 
were significantly more likely to promote this employee than were teams (M = 2.18, SD = .90).   
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 This is the same result found from the initial analyses, although prior analyses also found 
significant results for perspective and the perspective x responsibility interaction on the 
performance variable. 
Unlike the initial analysis for this variable, a within-subjects ANOVA between teams and 
team members on the pay variable showed a significant effect of perspective, F(1, 64) = 5.98, p 
< .05, η2 = .09.  Teams allocated a significantly percentage of pay increase to the employee than 
did team members (M = 3.97, SD = 2.02, and M = 4.70, SD = 2.75, respectively).  These results 
showed support for hypotheses 2 and 2c. 
As found previously, a within-subjects ANOVA between teams and team members on 
the layoff variable showed a significant effect of perspective, F(1, 64) = 12.79, p = .001, η2 = 
.17.  Teams (M = 1.98, SD = .12) rated the employee higher on this variable, or were 
significantly less likely to fire the employee than were team members (M = 1.90, SD = .21), 
showing support for hypothesis 2 and 2c. 
The last analyses run were for the commission decrease variable.  A between-subjects 
ANOVA between supervisors and teams showed a significant effect of perspective, F(1, 132) = 
11.58, p = .001, η2 = .08, in the opposite direction as hypothesized.  Supervisors rated the 
employee lower, or lowered his percentage of commission significantly more than did teams (M 
= 1.88, SD = 2.89, and M = .58, SD = 1.11, respectively).  A within-subjects ANOVA between 
teams and team members also found a significant effect of perspective, F(1, 64) = 10.92, p < .01, 
η2 = .15.  Specifically, teams rated the employee higher on this variable, or lowered his 
commission significantly less than did team members (M = .58, SD = 1.11, and M = 1.62, SD = 
2.68, respectively).  These were the same results found for the commission decrease variable in 
the previous analyses. 
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 To summarize the two sets of analyses, one major difference between them is that once 
the participants who did not pass the manipulation checks were removed, no interactions were 
found to be significant.  Also, in addition to those hypotheses previously supported, in the second 
set of analyses hypothesis 2b was now supported for the overall performance and promotability 
variables, hypothesis 2c was supported for the pay increase variable, and hypothesis 2c was no 
longer found to be significant in the opposite direction for the overall performance variable.  All 
other findings from the original analyses remain the same. 
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 Discussion 
 Overall, there was minimal support found for the hypotheses.  Although much past 
research (as discussed previously) has shown an escalation of commitment effect due to 
responsibility, the present study found no significant effects of rater responsibility.  As Slaughter 
et al. (2003) suggested, participants may not have felt truly responsible for the hiring decision, 
and, therefore, for the employee’s poor performance.  Or, as Citera et al. (1999) noted, all of 
their participants reported a high degree of responsibility for the hiring decision, diminishing 
differences between the responsibility conditions.  Indeed, in the present study, while degree of 
felt responsibility was not measured, many participants in the team member condition who were 
not responsible for the hiring decision failed to realize who was responsible or thought 
themselves or their group made the hiring decision (recall that this manipulation was successful 
for 60% of the team members).  Also, the participants may not have fully realized their role as 
either team member or supervisor, and thus all participants evaluated the employee from a 
similar perspective.  In listening to the teams discuss their relationship with the employee, 
oftentimes they stated that if they were in charge of evaluating an employee, they must be that 
employee’s supervisor. 
There were, however, some significant findings based on perspective.  As hypothesized, 
supervisors gave higher ratings than teams and team members for the employee on the overall 
performance and promotability variables.  Though not hypothesized, team members also gave 
significantly higher ratings than did teams on these two variables.  One explanation for this 
finding may be that team members were able to diffuse the responsibility of their decisions prior 
to meeting as a group (as previously discussed), making their ratings similar to supervisors.  
Team member and supervisor ratings may also have been similar due to team members not yet 
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 fully realizing they were part of a team (82.4% of team members stated they were part of a team, 
while 97.2% of teams stated they were such). 
Teams also gave higher ratings than team members on the pay increase and layoff 
variables, and higher ratings than team members as well as supervisors on the commission 
decrease variable.  In other words, teams increased the employee’s rate of pay significantly more 
than did team members, as well as decreased the employee’s rate of commission significantly 
less than both team members and supervisors, and were significantly less likely to fire the 
employee than team members.  Team members in the present study may have been more likely 
to fire the employee and decrease his rate of commission due to an attempt to correct the poor 
behavior of the team member that is detrimental to the team (Slaughter et al., 2003).  Teams, on 
the other hand, may be more lenient on these variables due to a desire to maintain the group’s 
level of cohesiveness, to not disturb the peace, or to maintain the group’s positive identity in the 
eyes of others (Turner & Horvitz, 2001).  
Differences between perspectives with regard to the findings may also be due to the type 
of employment decision differentially affecting the amount of escalation demonstrated by raters, 
or that negative and positive employment decisions may operate differently (Citera et al., 1999).  
Negative employment decisions (or disciplinary decisions) refer to those items asking 
participants to make decisions regarding a demotion, layoff, or commission decrease for the 
employee being evaluated.  Positive employment decisions (or reward decisions) are those 
asking participants to set the percentage of pay increase for the employee, allocate bonus 
vacation days, and designate a bonus amount.  Researchers have found that participants were 
more favorable in their ratings when a person’s job was on the line or they faced demotion 
(Citera et al.).  When faced with negative employment decisions such as these, individual 
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 decision-makers were more likely to escalate commitment in the positive direction than when 
considering the positive employment decisions, which did not induce escalation behaviors.  The 
authors suggested that participants saw negative employment decisions as more likely to reflect 
negatively on them than positive decisions.  Thus, if teams viewed the employee’s performance 
as more likely to reflect on them than did team members (who may have diffused responsibility 
before evaluating as a team) and supervisors, then this may have led to more escalation in teams 
on some decisions than in team members or supervisors. 
 Lastly, in the present study the decision-making context did interact with responsibility 
on two of the variables tested (in the first set of analyses), overall performance and bonus 
vacation days (see Figures 1 and 2).   
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Figure 1.  Responsibility x Perspective Interaction on Bonus Vacation Days – Supervisors and Teams 
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Figure 2.  Responsibility x Perspective Interaction on Bonus Vacation Days – Team Members and Teams 
 
Teams were found to escalate to a greater degree than supervisors and team members on 
vacation days (or allocated significantly more bonus vacation days to the employee).  Per the 
team discussions that ensued during the rating aspect of the study, this effect may be due to 
teams desiring to show support for fellow team members who they see as performing poorly, but 
whose performance they excused as possibly being due to having personal problems, thus 
necessitating more personal days from work.  This effect may also be an attempt to motivate the 
employee to perform better (i.e., “the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B;” Kerr, 1975).  
Additionally, while teams did view the ratee’s performance as poor (as demonstrated by their 
ratings on the performance, likelihood of improvement, and promotability variables), they 
appeared concerned about demotivating the employee to the point of him voluntarily leaving the 
job.  Thus, while they rated his performance more harshly, when it came to reward decisions 
 39
 based on his performance, teams expressed concern about leading the employee to quit by 
allocating too few vacation days as compared to the company average (or too small of a pay 
increase as compared to the company average).   
The second interaction showed that team members escalated to a significantly greater 
degree than did teams on the performance variable due to responsibility (see Figure 3).  
Specifically, teams who were responsible for the hiring decision rated the employee higher than 
those not responsible, but still lower than team members in both conditions.  Team members who 
were responsible rated the employee lower than team members not responsible for hiring.  Thus, 
it appears that team members in both conditions felt similarly responsible for the hiring decision 
and the employee’s subsequent performance.  Responsibility may have affected team members 
differentially due to them being able to diffuse the level of felt responsibility while evaluating 
independently (making team members in both conditions evaluate the employee similarly), then 
polarizing in their evaluations as teams. 
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Figure 3. Responsibility x Perspective Interaction on Performance – Team Members and Teams 
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 Limitations 
 One limitation of this study is that the teams had prior knowledge of the evaluation items 
as they completed them in the team member condition prior to meeting as teams.  This may have 
influenced the team ratings in a number of ways.  For example, the team member’s behavior in 
the team condition may have been altered by their participation in the team member condition 
such that the team evaluation may have reflected effects of memory, practice, boredom, or 
sensitization (Crocker & Algina, 1986).  These effects or others, if they existed in this study, 
could have been avoided by using separate teams, 72 for the team member condition and an 
additional 72 making up the team condition, instead of using the same persons for both.  
However, this may reduce the external validity of the study as it is unlikely that, in practice, team 
members make initial decisions and separate teams vote on these or make them again. 
Another limitation is the inability to directly compare the results of the separate analyses 
for all between-subject and within-subject hypotheses.  Additionally, in computing 20 separate 
analyses, Type I error rate may have been inflated, increasing the power of the analyses to find 
differences between groups.  One method for avoiding alpha error inflation would be to use a 
Bonferroni adjustment, or to assign alpha for each analysis such that experimentwise alpha does 
not exceed the .05 level (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  However, in doing this for so many 
analyses, alpha would be so small than finding anything reaching significance would have been 
very unlikely. 
A final limitation is that of many participants not passing the manipulation checks.  
While this study was designed to improve upon the perspective manipulation of Slaughter et al. 
(2003) by actually putting participants in a team, it may be that in a laboratory environment 
many participants did not feel like or truly see themselves as part of a team.  Also, participants 
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 may have understood that they were part of a team or that they hired the employee without 
actually feeling responsible as a team or individually for hiring the employee or for his 
performance.  One method of strengthening these manipulations may be to use intact teams in 
classroom settings, such as business or management courses requiring students to form teams to 
accomplish tasks throughout a semester.  Repeated interactions with real-life consequences (such 
as a team grade on a project) should strengthen both team members viewing themselves as a 
team and the level of responsibility each feels for the paper or project.   
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 Implications for Future Research 
According to Gordon (1992), 82% of companies employing 100 or more persons reported 
the use of teams.  Additionally, 68% of Fortune 1000 companies in 1993 reported the use of self-
managed work teams (Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 1995).  With the vast shift from managers 
toward teams to accomplish numerous organizational tasks, the functions of employee selection 
and performance evaluation have been relegated from supervisors to teams in some organizations 
(Brody & Frank, 2002; Liden et al., 1999).  Unfortunately, research on team decision-making in 
this context has not caught up with industry’s fervor for team usage.  Understanding when teams 
create or amplify biases is an important issue for researchers and practitioners alike (Argote, 
Gruenfeld & Naquin, 2001).   
Studies have shown that once a hiring or project initiation decision has been made there 
is a tendency to evaluate subsequent performance more favorably if the appraiser took part in the 
decision process, even in light of negative information regarding performance of the employee or 
project (Bazerman et al., 1982; Schoorman, 1988; Staw, 1976).  Most research on escalation bias 
has focused on decisions made by participants under extreme conditions of responsibility; that is, 
they were either free to make the original decision or it was made for them (Rao & Monk, 1999).  
However, there are intermediate levels of responsibility that individuals can experience, such as 
in a situation where blame for an adverse decision outcome can be diffused among decision-
makers.  The few studies that have investigated escalation decisions in a group decision context 
have yielded mixed results, calling for more research needed in this area.   
Much research has suggested the likelihood of an escalation of commitment extending to 
team decision-making, and while prior research on group processes suggests these effects are 
likely to be more severe than that typically observed for individuals (Argote et al., 2001; Jones & 
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 Roelofsma, 2000; Whyte, 1993), the present study found that the effects of perspective varied 
dependent upon the variable in question, and that perspective and responsibility interacted for 
some variables.  While there has been a voluminous body of research citing polarization effects 
leading to groups exacerbating individual decisions (Jones & Roelofsma, 2000; Liden et al., 
1999; Whyte, 1993), in many cases it may be that the polarization effects are unable to outweigh 
the effects of diffused responsibility during group decision-making, making the ratings provided 
by the team variable dependent on the type of decision they are making, the degree to which they 
feel responsible, and the degree to which they agree or disagree with their group.  More research 
should be done analyzing different types of employment decisions (e.g., rewards or 
punishments), assessing how much each participant feels responsible for the employee’s 
performance, and looking at possible negative escalation effects due to group disagreement.    
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 Appendix A: Scenarios 
 
Appendix A1 
Supervisor – Responsible (Hiring Phase) 
Hiring a Sales Representative at Lerman Furniture, Inc. 
 
You are a supervisor at Lerman Furniture, Inc. Lerman is a medium-sized retail distributor of 
home and office furnishings. The firm employs 3000 persons and has showrooms in numerous 
major cities, including St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; and Dallas, TX.  
Lerman Furniture is a team-based organization such that retail employees at each store location 
are organized into teams. The team members often work side-by-side, relying on each other to 
make or complete furniture sales. In addition, the teams compete against other teams from stores 
within their district, and the store with the largest sales volume at the end of each year receives a 
bonus.  
 
As a supervisor at one of Lerman's Dallas, TX stores, you supervise one such team, and you 
work together to carry out responsibilities as a group.  One of your duties includes motivating 
team members to peak customer interest in the quality and attractiveness of your company’s 
furniture in order to maintain high sales.  You are also responsible for encouraging team 
members to help each other make sales and for hiring and evaluating team members. 
 
Recently, the retirement of one of the sales representatives has led to the need to hire a new sales 
employee.  As a supervisor, it is your responsibility to decide whom to hire.  Though there were 
several qualified applicants for the position, after multiple assessments used by Lerman in the 
selection process, two finalists emerged as the most qualified:  Mike Brown and Dave 
Waterman.  In the following folders, you will find some information regarding these two 
candidates.  For each candidate you will find two letters of recommendation from former 
employers, as well as the results from three different assessments. The first assessment measures 
the applicant’s general intelligence, or cognitive ability.  The second assessment is an integrity, 
or honesty test.  The third is a test that measures three dimensions of personality: a) extraversion: 
the extent to which the candidate is outgoing and friendly; b) dependability: the extent to which 
the candidate is reliable and trustworthy; and c) agreeableness: the extent to which the applicant 
is likely to work well with others and display a positive attitude.   
 
Please carefully review all given information on each candidate and choose one candidate for the 
position.   
 
Mark an “X” next to the candidate you decide to hire. 
 
  M. Brown     D. Waterman  
 
Below, please state which candidate you chose and describe why you chose this particular 
applicant: 
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 Appendix A2 
Supervisor – Not Responsible (Hiring Phase) 
Hiring a Sales Representative at Lerman Furniture, Inc. 
 
You are a supervisor at Lerman Furniture, Inc. Lerman is a medium-sized retail distributor of 
home and office furnishings. The firm employs 3000 persons and has showrooms in numerous 
major cities, including St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; and Dallas, TX.  
Lerman Furniture is a team-based organization such that retail employees at each store location 
are organized into teams. The team members often work side-by-side, relying on each other to 
make or complete furniture sales. In addition, the teams compete against other teams from stores 
within their district, and the store with the largest sales volume at the end of each year receives a 
bonus.  
  
As a supervisor at one of Lerman's Dallas, TX stores, you supervise one such team, and you 
work together to carry out responsibilities as a group.  One of your duties includes motivating 
team members to peak customer interest in the quality and attractiveness of your company’s 
furniture in order to maintain high sales.  You are also responsible for encouraging team 
members to help each other make sales and for hiring and evaluating team members. 
 
Recently, the retirement of one of the sales representatives has led to the need to hire a new sales 
employee.  Though there were several qualified applicants for the position, after multiple 
assessments used by Lerman in the selection process, two finalists emerged as the most 
qualified:  Mike Brown and Dave Waterman.  In the following folders, you will find some 
information regarding these two candidates.  For each candidate you will find two letters of 
recommendation from former employers, as well as the results from three different assessments. 
The first assessment measures the applicant’s general intelligence, or cognitive ability.  The 
second assessment is an integrity, or honesty test.  The third is a test that measures three 
dimensions of personality: a) extraversion: the extent to which the candidate is outgoing and 
friendly; b) dependability: the extent to which the candidate is reliable and trustworthy; and c) 
agreeableness: the extent to which the applicant is likely to work well with others and display a 
positive attitude.   
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 Appendix A3 
Team – Responsible (Hiring Phase) 
 
Hiring a Sales Representative at Lerman Furniture, Inc. 
 
You are a team at Lerman Furniture, Inc. Lerman is a medium-sized retail distributor of home 
and office furnishings. The firm employs 3000 persons and has showrooms in numerous major 
cities, including St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; and Dallas, TX. 
Lerman Furniture is a team-based organization such that retail employees at each store location 
are organized into teams. The team members often work side-by-side, relying on each other to 
make or complete furniture sales. In addition, the teams compete against teams from stores 
within their district, and the store with the highest amount of sales at the end of each year 
receives a bonus. 
 
As an employee at one of Lerman’s Dallas, TX stores, you and your coworkers are organized 
into one such team, and you work together to carry out responsibilities as a group. One of your 
duties includes motivating team members to peak customer interest in the quality and 
attractiveness of your company’s furniture in order to maintain high sales. You are also 
responsible for encouraging team members to help each other make sales and for hiring and 
evaluating other team members. 
 
Recently, the retirement of one of the sales representatives has led to the need to hire a new sales 
employee. It is the team’s responsibility to decide whom to hire. Though there were several 
qualified applicants for the position, after multiple assessments used by Lerman in the selection 
process, two finalists emerged as the most qualified: Mike Brown and Dave Waterman. In the 
following folders, you will find some information regarding these two candidates. For each 
candidate you will find two letters of recommendation from former employers, as well as the 
results from three different assessments. The first assessment measures the applicant’s general 
intelligence, or cognitive ability. The second assessment is an integrity, or honesty test. The third 
is a test that measures three dimensions of personality: a) extraversion: the extent to which the 
candidate is outgoing and friendly; b) dependability: the extent to which the candidate is reliable 
and trustworthy; and c) agreeableness: the extent to which the applicant is likely to work well 
with others and display a positive attitude. 
 
Please carefully review the candidate information and choose one candidate for the position.  
Remember, you are a part of this team and will be working with this individual. 
 
Mark an “X” next to the candidate the team decides to hire. 
 
   M. Brown        D. Waterman  
 
Below, please state which candidate you chose and describe why you chose this particular 
applicant: 
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 Appendix A4 
Team – Not Responsible (Hiring Phase) 
 
Hiring a Sales Representative at Lerman Furniture, Inc. 
 
You are a team at Lerman Furniture, Inc. Lerman is a medium-sized retail distributor of home 
and office furnishings. The firm employs 3000 persons and has showrooms in numerous major 
cities, including St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; and Dallas, TX. 
Lerman Furniture is a team-based organization such that retail employees at each store location 
are organized into teams. The team members often work side-by-side, relying on each other to 
make or complete furniture sales. In addition, the teams compete against teams from stores 
within their district, and the store with the highest amount of sales at the end of each year 
receives a bonus. 
 
As an employee at one of Lerman’s Dallas, TX stores, you and your coworkers are organized 
into one such team, and you work together to carry out responsibilities as a group. One of your 
duties includes motivating team members to peak customer interest in the quality and 
attractiveness of your company’s furniture in order to maintain high sales. You are also 
responsible for encouraging team members to help each other make sales and for hiring and 
evaluating other team members. 
 
Recently, the retirement of one of the sales representatives has led to the need to hire a new sales 
employee. Though there were several qualified applicants for the position, after multiple 
assessments used by Lerman in the selection process, two finalists emerged as the most 
qualified: Mike Brown and Dave Waterman. In the following folders, you will find some 
information regarding these two candidates. For each candidate you will find two letters of 
recommendation from former employers, as well as the results from three different assessments. 
The first assessment measures the applicant’s general intelligence, or cognitive ability. The 
second assessment is an integrity, or honesty test. The third is a test that measures three 
dimensions of personality: a) extraversion: the extent to which the candidate is outgoing and 
friendly; b) dependability: the extent to which the candidate is reliable and trustworthy; and c) 
agreeableness: the extent to which the applicant is likely to work well with others and display a 
positive attitude. 
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 Appendix A5 
Supervisor – Responsible (Evaluation Phase) 
 
Performance  Evaluations of Sales Representatives at Lerman Furniture, Inc. 
 
Recall that you are a supervisor at Lerman Furniture, Inc. Lerman is a medium-sized retail 
distributor of home and office furnishings. The firm employs 3000 persons and has showrooms 
in St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; and Dallas, TX.  Lerman Furniture is 
a team-based organization such that retail employees at each store location are organized into 
teams. The team members often work side-by-side, relying on each other to make or complete 
furniture sales. In addition, the teams compete against other teams from stores within their 
district, and the store with the largest sales volume at the end of each year receives a bonus.  
 
As a supervisor at one of Lerman's Dallas, TX stores, you supervise one such team, who works 
together to carry out responsibilities as a group.  Your principle duties include motivating team 
members to peak customer interest in the quality and attractiveness of your company’s furniture 
in order to maintain high sales, encouraging team members to help each other make sales as 
needed, and hiring and evaluating team members. 
 
As you may remember, the retirement of one of the sales representatives led to the need to hire a 
new sales employee.  Though there were several qualified applicants for the position, after 
multiple assessments used by Lerman in the selection process, two finalists emerged as the most 
qualified:  Mike Brown and Dave Waterman.  As the team’s supervisor, one of your 
responsibilities was to make the final hiring decision based on a cognitive ability (general 
intelligence) test, a personality test (including items testing for extraversion, dependability, and 
agreeableness), an integrity (honesty) test, and two letters of reference from former employers.  
After reviewing the materials, you chose Dave Waterman (Mike).    
 
Dave began work at Lerman 12 months ago.  Although his test scores and recommendations suggested 
that he would be an excellent worker, his performance was variable.  For example, Dave often agrees to 
stay late or to help coworkers with their tasks.  However, he has been unable to reach his own sales 
goals. His sales started out at a relatively high volume; but lately his sales have been slightly less than 
average.  In addition, Dave has, at times, neglected customers that eventually left the showroom in 
frustration.  Taken together, Dave’s performance has adversely impacted this team’s overall sales.   
 
The time has come for Dave's first annual performance review.  In addition to being responsible 
for hiring Dave, as the supervisor of the team to which Dave belongs, you are responsible for 
evaluating his performance at the end of this probationary period.  Considering the information 
presented in the attached folder, please evaluate Dave’s performance and make decisions about 
him using the items and rating scales located on the next page.  
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 Appendix A6 
Supervisor – Not Responsible (Evaluation Phase) 
 
Performance  Evaluations of Sales Representatives at Lerman Furniture, Inc. 
 
Recall that you are a supervisor at Lerman Furniture, Inc. Lerman is a medium-sized retail 
distributor of home and office furnishings. The firm employs 3000 persons and has showrooms 
in St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; and Dallas, TX.  Lerman Furniture is 
a team-based organization such that retail employees at each store location are organized into 
teams. The team members often work side-by-side, relying on each other to make or complete 
furniture sales. In addition, the teams compete against other teams from stores within their 
district, and the store with the largest sales volume at the end of each year receives a bonus.  
 
As a supervisor at one of Lerman's Dallas, TX stores, you supervise one such team, who works 
together to carry out responsibilities as a group.  Your principle duties include motivating team 
members to peak customer interest in the quality and attractiveness of your company’s furniture 
in order to maintain high sales, encouraging team members to help each other make sales as 
needed, and hiring and evaluating team members. 
 
As you may remember, the retirement of one of the sales representatives led to the need to hire a new 
sales employee.  Though there were several qualified applicants for the position, after multiple 
assessments used by Lerman in the selection process, two finalists emerged as the most qualified:  Mike 
Brown and Dave Waterman.  Based on a cognitive ability (general intelligence) test, a personality test 
(including items testing for extraversion, dependability, and agreeableness), an integrity (honesty) test, 
and two letters of reference from former employers, the Human Resources Department hired Dave 
Waterman (Mike Brown) for the position. 
 
Dave began work at Lerman 12 months ago.  Although his test scores and recommendations suggested 
that he would be an excellent worker, his performance was variable.  For example, Dave often agrees to 
stay late or to help  coworkers with their tasks.  However, he has been unable to reach his own sales 
goals. His sales started out at a relatively high volume; but lately his sales have been slightly less than 
average.  In addition, Dave has, at times, neglected customers that eventually left the showroom in 
frustration.  Taken together, Dave’s performance has adversely impacted this team’s overall sales.   
 
The time has come for Dave's first annual performance review.  Even though you are not responsible for 
hiring Dave, as the supervisor of the team to which Dave belongs, you are responsible for evaluating his 
performance at the end of this probationary period.  Considering the information presented in the 
attached folder, please evaluate Dave's performance and make decisions about him using the items and 
rating scales located on the next page.  
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 Appendix A7 
Team Member – Responsible (Evaluation Phase) 
 
Performance Evaluations of Sales Representatives at Lerman Furniture, Inc. 
 
Recall that you are a team member at Lerman Furniture, Inc. Lerman is a medium-sized retail 
distributor of home and office furnishings. The firm employs 3000 persons and has showrooms 
in St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; and Dallas, TX. Lerman Furniture is a 
team-based organization such that retail employees at each store location are organized into 
teams. The team members often work side-by-side, relying on each other to make or complete 
furniture sales. In addition, the teams compete against other teams from stores within their 
district, and the store with the largest sales volume at the end of each year receives a bonus. 
 
As an employee at one of Lerman’s Dallas, TX stores, you and your coworkers are organized 
into one such team, and you work together to carry out responsibilities as a group. Your team’s 
principle duties include motivating team members to peak customer interest in the quality and 
attractiveness of your company’s furniture in order to maintain high sales, encouraging team 
members to help each other make sales as needed, and hiring and evaluating team members. 
 
As you may remember, the retirement of one of the sales representatives led to the need to hire a 
new sales employee. Though there were several qualified applicants for the position, after 
multiple assessments used by Lerman in the selection process, two finalists emerged as the most 
qualified: Mike Brown and Dave Waterman. As a team member, one of your responsibilities was 
to make the final hiring decision based on a cognitive ability (general intelligence) test, a 
personality test (including items testing for extraversion, dependability, and agreeableness), an 
integrity (honesty) test, and two letters of reference from former employers. After carefully 
reviewing the materials, you chose Dave Waterman (Mike). 
 
Dave began work at Lerman 12 months ago. Although his test scores and recommendations 
suggested that he would be an excellent worker, his performance was variable. For example, 
Dave often agrees to stay late or to help coworkers with their tasks. However, he has been unable 
to reach his own sales goals. His sales started out at a relatively high volume; but lately his sales 
have been slightly less than average. In addition, Dave has, at times, neglected customers that 
eventually left the showroom in frustration. Taken together, Dave’s performance has adversely 
impacted this team’s overall sales. 
 
The time has come for Dave’s first annual performance review. In addition to being responsible 
for hiring Dave, as part of the team to which Dave belongs, you are responsible for evaluating 
his performance at the end of this probationary period. Considering the information presented in 
the attached folder, please evaluate Dave’s performance and make decisions about him using the 
items and rating scales located on the next page. 
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 Appendix A8 
Team Member – Not Responsible (Evaluation Phase) 
Performance Evaluations of Sales Representatives at Lerman Furniture, Inc. 
 
Recall that you are a team member at Lerman Furniture, Inc. Lerman is a medium-sized retail 
distributor of home and office furnishings. The firm employs 3000 persons and has showrooms 
in St. Paul, Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; and Dallas, TX. Lerman Furniture is a 
team-based organization such that retail employees at each store location are organized into 
teams. The team members often work side-by-side, relying on each other to make or complete 
furniture sales. In addition, the teams compete against other teams from stores within their 
district, and the store with the largest sales volume at the end of each year receives a bonus. 
 
As an employee at one of Lerman’s Dallas, TX stores, you and your coworkers are organized 
into one such team, and you work together to carry out responsibilities as a group. Your team’s 
principle duties include motivating team members to peak customer interest in the quality and 
attractiveness of your company’s furniture in order to maintain high sales, encouraging team 
members to help each other make sales as needed, arid hiring and evaluating team members. 
 
As you may remember, the retirement of one of the sales representatives led to the need to hire a new 
sales employee.  Though there were several qualified applicants for the position, after multiple 
assessments used by Lerman in the selection process, two finalists emerged as the most qualified:  Mike 
Brown and Dave Waterman.  Based on a cognitive ability (general intelligence) test, a personality test 
(including items testing for extraversion, dependability, and agreeableness), an integrity (honesty) test, 
and two letters of reference from former employers, the Human Resources Department hired Dave 
Waterman (Mike Brown) for the position. 
 
Dave began work at Lerman 12 months ago.  Although his test scores and recommendations suggested 
that he would be an excellent worker, his performance was variable.  For example, Dave often agrees to 
stay late or to help  coworkers with their tasks.  However, he has been unable to reach his own sales 
goals. His sales started out at a relatively high volume; but lately his sales have been slightly less than 
average.  In addition, Dave has, at times, neglected customers that eventually left the showroom in 
frustration.  Taken together, Dave’s performance has adversely impacted this team’s overall sales.   
 
The time has come for Dave's first annual performance review.  Even though you are not 
responsible for hiring Dave, as a member of the team to which Dave belongs, you are responsible 
for evaluating his performance at the end of this probationary period.  Considering the 
information presented in the attached folder, please evaluate Dave's performance and make 
decisions about him using the items and rating scales located on the next page.  
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 Appendix A9 
Team – Responsible (Evaluation Phase) 
 
Performance Evaluations of Sales Representatives at Lerman Furniture, Inc. 
 
Recall that you are a team at Lerman Furniture, Inc. Lerman is a medium-sized retail distributor 
of home and office furnishings. The firm employs 3000 persons and has showrooms in St. Paul, 
Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; and Dallas, TX. Lerman Furniture is a team-
based organization such that retail employees at each store location are organized into teams. 
The team members often work side-by-side, relying on each other to make or complete furniture 
sales. In addition, the teams compete against other teams from stores within their district, and the 
store with the largest sales volume at the end of each year receives a bonus. 
 
As an employee at one of Lerman’s Dallas, TX stores, you and your coworkers are organized 
into one such team, and you work together to carry out responsibilities as a group. Your team’s 
principle duties include motivating team members to peak customer interest in the quality and 
attractiveness of your company’s furniture in order to maintain high sales, encouraging team 
members to help each other make sales as needed, and hiring and evaluating team members. 
 
As you may remember, the retirement of one of the sales representatives led to the need to hire a 
new sales employee. Though there were several qualified applicants for the position, after 
multiple assessments used by Lerman in the selection process, two finalists emerged as the most 
qualified: Mike Brown and Dave Waterman. As a team, one of your responsibilities was to make 
the final hiring decision based on a cognitive ability (general intelligence) test, a personality test 
(including items testing for extraversion, dependability, and agreeableness), an integrity 
(honesty) test, and two letters of reference from former employers. After carefully reviewing the 
materials, you chose Dave Waterman (Mike). 
 
Dave began work at Lerman 12 months ago. Although his test scores and recommendations 
suggested that he would be an excellent worker, his performance was variable. For example, 
Dave often agrees to stay late or to help coworkers with their tasks. However, he has been unable 
to reach his own sales goals. His sales started out at a relatively high volume; but lately his sales 
have been slightly less than average. In addition, Dave has, at times, neglected customers that 
eventually left the showroom in frustration. Taken together, Dave’s performance has adversely 
impacted this team’s overall sales. 
 
The time has come for Dave’s first annual performance review. In addition to being responsible 
for hiring Dave, the team is responsible for evaluating his performance at the end of this 
probationary period. Considering the information presented in the attached folder, please 
evaluate Dave’s performance and make decisions about him using the items and rating scales 
located on the next page. 
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 Appendix A10 
Team – Not Responsible (Evaluation Phase) 
Performance Evaluations of Sales Representatives at Lerman Furniture, Inc. 
 
Recall that you are a team at Lerman Furniture, Inc. Lerman is a medium-sized retail distributor 
of home and office furnishings. The firm employs 3000 persons and has showrooms in St. Paul, 
Minnesota; Columbus, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; and Dallas, TX. Lerman Furniture is a team-
based organization such that retail employees at each store location are organized into teams. 
The team members often work side-by-side, relying on each other to make or complete furniture 
sales. In addition, the teams compete against other teams from stores within their district, and the 
store with the largest sales volume at the end of each year receives a bonus. 
 
As an employee at one of Lerman’s Dallas, TX stores, you and your coworkers are organized 
into one such team, and you work together to carry out responsibilities as a group. Your team’s 
principle duties include motivating team members to peak customer interest in the quality and 
attractiveness of your company’s furniture in order to maintain high sales, encouraging team 
members to help each other make sales as needed, arid hiring and evaluating team members. 
 
As you may remember, the retirement of one of the sales representatives led to the need to hire a new 
sales employee.  Though there were several qualified applicants for the position, after multiple 
assessments used by Lerman in the selection process, two finalists emerged as the most qualified:  Mike 
Brown and Dave Waterman.  Based on a cognitive ability (general intelligence) test, a personality test 
(including items testing for extraversion, dependability, and agreeableness), an integrity (honesty) test, 
and two letters of reference from former employers, the Human Resources Department hired Dave 
Waterman (Mike Brown) for the position. 
 
Dave began work at Lerman 12 months ago.  Although his test scores and recommendations suggested 
that he would be an excellent worker, his performance was variable.  For example, Dave often agrees to 
stay late or to help  coworkers with their tasks.  However, he has been unable to reach his own sales 
goals. His sales started out at a relatively high volume; but lately his sales have been slightly less than 
average.  In addition, Dave has, at times, neglected customers that eventually left the showroom in 
frustration.  Taken together, Dave’s performance has adversely impacted this team’s overall sales.   
 
The time has come for Dave's first annual performance review.  Even though you are not 
responsible for hiring Dave, the team is responsible for evaluating his performance at the end of 
this probationary period.  Considering the information presented in the attached folder, please 
evaluate Dave's performance and make decisions about him using the items and rating scales 
located on the next page.  
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 Appendix B: Hiring Materials – Dave Waterman 
 
Appendix B1 
 
Letter of Recommendation – Dave Waterman 
 
Allen’s Furniture Supply 
Personnel Department 
 
February 10, 2002 
 
Lerman’s Furniture, Inc. 
Human Resources Department 
121 Tollway 
Dallas, TX 76203 
 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
Please accept this letter of recommendation as strong support of Dave Waterman’s application to 
be a sales representative for Lerman’s Furniture, Incorporated. Dave is a former employee of 
mine who has been very active professionally in the fields of furniture sales and general retail. 
 
Dave Waterman has always been well respected by his employers, peers, and customers while at 
Allen’s Furniture Supply. If any criticism can be said of Dave, it is that he is extremely 
motivated in his work and fastidious about details. At times he may intimidate those around him 
who have neither the discipline nor the desire to put forth the optimal effort which ensures 
success. At the same time, Dave is an ethical and professional employee who exemplifies the 
philosophy of customer satisfaction. He is a promising sales representative who will be 
successful in your company. 
 
I am proud to have the opportunity to recommend Dave Waterman to Lerman’s for your 
consideration. Please give him your support as the next Lerman’s representative. You will be 
proud to have him as a member of your sales team. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Mark Smith 
General Director 
Allen’s Furniture Supply 
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 Appendix B2 
 
Letter of Recommendation – Dave Waterman 
 
Sears Furniture 
11 Galleria Drive #804 
Dallas, TX 76202 
 
 
February 12, 2002 
 
Management and Human Resources Department: 
 
I am writing this letter in response to a request by Dave Waterman for a recommendation. Mr. 
Waterman worked in the furniture division of Sears Department Store for over a year. While at 
Sears, he appeared to perform his job to the best of his ability, and voluntarily left the company 
for a position elsewhere. 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration of Dave Waterman as a Lerman’s Sales 
Representative. 
 
Best regards, 
 
 
Tim Hanson 
Director, Furniture Sales 
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 Appendix B3 
 
Cognitive Ability Test – Dave Waterman 
 
Directions:  Please complete the following questions without the aid of any problem-solving 
device.  This is a timed test in which you have 10 minutes to complete. 
 
1. Cold is the opposite of ______. 
 a) frigid b) unfeeling c) responsive d) arctic 
 
2. In the following set of words, which word is different? 
 a) skip b) run c) jump d) think 
 
3. How many of the five pairs of items below are exactly the same? 
  72425137  72425187 
    3689242    3689242 
      478901      478901 
        58279        52879 
          4301          4301 
 
4. Billy bought some stereos for $240. He sold them for $360, making $30 on each radio.     
      How many radios did he buy? 
 
5. In military time 1500 hours is what time? 
 
6. In Summer the time changes by moving: 
 a) forward by one hour b) backward by one hour c) it doesn’t change 
 
7. Which two of the choices have the same quantity? 
 a) 1/4 b) 2/3 c) 3/8 d) 2/8 
 
8. Is the third statement true or false? 
 Larry is a boy. 
 All boys like sports. 
 Larry likes sports. 
 
9. What number comes next in this pattern? 
4  2  2  8  2  2  16  2  2      
 
10. Which does not belong? 
a) doughnut b) tire c) ring d) ball 
 
11.  The first two statements are true statements.  Is the third statement true or false? 
  Some doodles are daggets. 
       Some daggets are dapples.   
       Some doodles would have to be dapples. 
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 12.  Flower is to garden as wave is to _______. 
  a) lake b) hand c) ocean d) waterfall 
 
13.  Two runners start in the same location and run 4 miles in opposite directions.  They then 
  both turn left and run 3 miles in that direction.  How far apart are the runners now? 
  a) 7 miles b) 25 miles c) 10 miles d) 14 miles 
 
14.  Which word is a synonym for the word “lawlessness”? 
  a) legitimate b) disorder c) enforced d) controlled 
 
15.  Which word best completes this sentence? 
   
  I am friendly even to people who are ________.  
  a) kind b) generous c) happy d) disagreeable   
 
16.  What is one-fifth of one fifth of 100? 
  a) 4 b) 25 c) 10 d) 20  
 
17.  Whale is to mammal as frog is to _____. 
  a) reptile b) amphibian c) mammal d) invertebrate 
 
18.  Solve the following equation for x: 
  3x + 2(2-x) = ______ 
  a) 4 b) – 4/5 c) – 4 d) 2 
 
19.  Which item does not belong? 
  a) apple b) banana c) tomato d) carrot 
 
20.  Cat is to kitten as bear is to ______. 
  a) cub b) pup c) grizzly d) panda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Score:  
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 Appendix B4 
 
Integrity Test – Dave Waterman 
 
Directions: Please answer all questions accurately to the best of your ability. Answer using the 
scale 1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=agree/neutral, 4=somewhat disagree, or 5=strongly 
disagree. Please select only one choice for each item. 
 
 
1. I am difficult to get along with at times.  
2. I am not always honest.  
3. I have thought of hitting someone who really deserves it.  
4. I am not very prompt.  
5. I daydream when I am bored.  
6. Sometimes one must break the rules to get the job done.  
7. I have in the past stayed home from work or school when not    
         really sick. 
 
8. Managers expect people to ignore company rules and policies.  
9. I get annoyed when someone tries to tell me what to do.  
10. Using force is okay if defending yourself.  
11. I will probably change jobs more than once in the next year.  
12. I sometimes lose my temper.  
13. I have gotten into a physical fight when provoked.  
14. I feel guilty often.  
15. I like doing things my own way.  
16. I rarely pay a lot of attention to how I look and dress.  
17. I have a hard time smiling when I am having a bad day.  
18. I have gotten in trouble at work or school for just fooling 
         around. 
 
19. I am often dissatisfied with myself.  
20. I rarely have excess energy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Score:  
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 Appendix B5 
 
Personality Test Scores  
 
Employee Name   Dave Waterman 
   
Personality Assessment:  
  
 Extraversion 9/10 
    
 Dependability 9/10 
    
 Agreeableness 6/10 
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 Appendix B6 
 
Summary of Test Results 
 
Candidate:  Dave Waterman 
 
Test and Score:  Test A, Intelligence......................................................... 18/20 
  Test B, Integrity ............................................................ 81/100 
  Test C, Personality 
   Extraversion ................................................................ 9/10 
   Dependability.............................................................. 9/10 
   Agreeableness ............................................................. 6/10 
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 Appendix C: Hiring Materials – Mike Brown 
 
Appendix C1 
 
Letter of Recommendation – Mike Brown 
 
A+ Auto Dealership 
19 Market Street 
Plano, TX 76201 
 
February 3, 2002 
 
Lerman’s Furniture, Inc. 
Personnel Department 
121 Tollway 
Dallas, TX 76203 
 
 
Dear Human Resources Manager: 
 
The purpose of this letter is to recommend a former employee, Mike Brown, for your company’s 
position of Sales Representative. Mike Brown has been a loyal and hard-working sales 
representative for A+ Auto Dealership for the last three years. While here, Mike was always 
attuned to the customers’ needs and wants, and always presented himself courteously and 
professionally. 
 
In addition, Mike was well liked by both his peers and his customers. He routinely had the 
highest monthly sales, and was always able to work well without supervision. Mike enjoyed his 
duties and was always helpful in training new employees. He was a value to our company, and 
will be a strong addition to Lerman’s. 
 
Although I am sad to see him go to pursue other opportunities, I am honored to be able to 
recommend Mike Brown to Lerman’s Furniture, Inc. for your consideration. Please call me if 
you need any further information, or have any questions. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
John Parker 
Sales Director, A+ Auto Dealership 
972-381-5567, sales office 
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 Appendix C2 
 
Letter of Recommendation – Mike Brown 
 
McKinley Sporting Goods 
7424 Indian School Road 
Phoenix, AZ 85024 
 
 
February 4, 2002 
 
Lerman’s Selection Personnel: 
 
As Mike Brown’s former employer and owner of McKinley Sporting Goods, I was pleased to be 
asked by Mike to write a letter of recommendation. Mike made a lasting impression on this 
company and me. 
 
Mike was routinely our top salesperson, continually exceeding the weekly goals set for the 
employees. He had an uncanny ability to assess and meet customers’ needs without appearing 
aggressive. 
 
Unfortunately, Mike and his family relocated to Texas; we at McKinley’s were disappointed to 
lose such an exceptional employee. However, I am certain he will soon become an indispensable 
part of your team. 
 
Respectfully, 
 
 
Josh McKinley 
CEO 
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 Appendix C3 
 
Cognitive Ability Test – Mike Brown 
 
Directions:  Please complete the following questions without the aid of any problem-solving 
device.  This is a timed test in which you have 10 minutes to complete. 
 
1. Cold is the opposite of ______. 
 a) frigid b) unfeeling c) responsive d) arctic 
 
2. In the following set of words, which word is different? 
 a) skip b) run c) jump d) think 
 
3. How many of the five pairs of items below are exactly the same? 
  72425137  72425187 
    3689242    3689242 
      478901      478901 
        58279        52879 
          4301          4301 
 
4. Billy bought some stereos for $240. He sold them for $360, making $30 on each radio.     
      How many radios did he buy? 
 
5. In military time 1500 hours is what time? 
 
6. In Summer the time changes by moving: 
 a) forward by one hour b) backward by one hour c) it doesn’t change 
 
7. Which two of the choices have the same quantity? 
 a) 1/4 b) 2/3 c) 3/8 d) 2/8 
 
8. Is the third statement true or false? 
 Larry is a boy. 
 All boys like sports. 
 Larry likes sports. 
 
9. What number comes next in this pattern? 
4  2  2  8  2  2  16  2  2        
 
10. Which does not belong? 
a) doughnut b) tire c) ring d) ball 
 
11.  The first two statements are true statements.  Is the third statement true or false? 
  Some doodles are daggets. 
       Some daggets are dapples.   
       Some doodles would have to be dapples. 
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 12.  Flower is to garden as wave is to _______. 
  a) lake b) hand c) ocean d) waterfall 
 
13.  Two runners start in the same location and run 4 miles in opposite directions.  They then 
  both turn left and run 3 miles in that direction.  How far apart are the runners now? 
  a) 7 miles b) 25 miles c) 10 miles d) 14 miles 
 
14.  Which word is a synonym for the word “lawlessness”? 
  a) legitimate b) disorder c) enforced d) controlled 
 
15.  Which word best completes this sentence? 
   
  I am friendly even to people who are ________.  
  a) kind b) generous c) happy d) disagreeable   
 
16.  What is one-fifth of one fifth of 100? 
  a) 4 b) 25 c) 10 d) 20  
 
17.  Whale is to mammal as frog is to _____. 
  a) reptile b) amphibian c) mammal d) invertebrate 
 
18.  Solve the following equation for x: 
  3x + 2(2-x) = ______ 
  a) 4 b) – 4/5 c) – 4 d) 2 
 
19.  Which item does not belong? 
  a) apple b) banana c) tomato d) carrot 
 
20.  Cat is to kitten as bear is to ______. 
  a) cub b) pup c) grizzly d) panda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Score:  
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 Appendix C4 
 
Integrity Test – Mike Brown 
 
Directions: Please answer all questions accurately to the best of your ability. Answer using the 
scale 1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=agree/neutral, 4=somewhat disagree, or 5=strongly 
disagree. Please select only one choice for each item. 
 
 
1. I am difficult to get along with at times.  
2. I am not always honest.  
3. I have thought of hitting someone who really deserves it.  
4. I am not very prompt.  
5. I daydream when I am bored.  
6. Sometimes one must break the rules to get the job done.  
7. I have in the past stayed home from work or school when not    
      really sick. 
 
8. Managers expect people to ignore company rules and policies.  
9. I get annoyed when someone tries to tell me what to do.  
10. Using force is okay if defending yourself.  
11. I will probably change jobs more than once in the next year.  
12. I sometimes lose my temper.  
13. I have gotten into a physical fight when provoked.  
14. I feel guilty often.  
15. I like doing things my own way.  
16. I rarely pay a lot of attention to how I look and dress.  
17. I have a hard time smiling when I am having a bad day.  
18. I have gotten in trouble at work or school for just fooling 
      around. 
 
19. I am often dissatisfied with myself.  
20. I rarely have excess energy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Score:  
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 Appendix C5 
 
Personality Test Scores 
 
Employee Name   Mike Brown 
   
Personality Assessment:  
  
 Extraversion 7/10 
  
 Dependability 7/10 
  
 Agreeableness 6/10 
  
 
 72
 Appendix C6 
 
Summary of Test Results 
 
Candidate:  Mike Brown 
 
Test and Score:  Test A, Intelligence......................................................... 14/20 
  Test B, Integrity ............................................................ 86/100 
  Test C, Personality 
   Extraversion ................................................................ 7/10 
   Dependability.............................................................. 7/10 
   Agreeableness ............................................................. 6/10 
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 Appendix D: Evaluation Materials – Dave Waterman 
 
Appendix D1 
 
Sales Associate Evaluation 
2003 – Annual Evaluation 
 
Store #:  ______ 
Employee Name: D. Waterman  
Date Hired: Feb/02 
 
 
Product 
 
Cost 
Average Units 
Sold per 
Employee* 
Total 
Monetary 
Value 
Units Sold by 
This 
Employee 
Total 
Monetary 
Value 
Leather Sofa Set      
Couch $3,000 14 $42,000 11 $33,000
Recliner $990 17 16,830 18 $17,820
Ottoman $450 6 2,700 5 $2,250
Home Office   
Computer Desk $1,000 13 13,000 11 $11,000
Desk Chair $200 8 1,600 10 $2,000
Bookshelf $350 12 4,200 7 $2,450
Totals  70 $80,330 62 $68,520
   
 
*not including sales made by this employee 
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 Appendix D2 
 
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY – Dave Waterman 
 
Our records show that you have purchased one of our products in the past month. We appreciate 
your business and welcome your comments regarding your experience with our staff.  Please 
answer the following questions regarding your interaction with the salesperson who sold you the 
product: 
 
Date of Purchase/Visit: ___/___/___ 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The salesperson approached me within a reasonable 
amount of time after I entered the store. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was careful to consider my specific 
furniture needs when suggesting a product. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was able to answer any questions I had 
concerning the product. 1 2 3 4 5 
I would feel comfortable dealing with this salesperson 
for a future purchase. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please provide any additional comments about your interaction with the salesperson and about 
how his/her service could be improved in the future. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY 
 
Our records show that you have purchased one of our products in the past month. We appreciate 
your business and welcome your comments regarding your experience with our staff.  Please 
answer the following questions regarding your interaction with the salesperson who sold you the 
product: 
 
Date of Purchase/Visit: ___/___/___ 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The salesperson approached me within a reasonable 
amount of time after I entered the store. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was careful to consider my specific 
furniture needs when suggesting a product. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was able to answer any questions I had 
concerning the product. 1 2 3 4 5 
I would feel comfortable dealing with this salesperson 
for a future purchase. 1 2 3 4 5 
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 Please provide any additional comments about your interaction with the salesperson and about 
how his/her service could be improved in the future. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY 
 
Our records show that you have purchased one of our products in the past month. We appreciate 
your business and welcome your comments regarding your experience with our staff.  Please 
answer the following questions regarding your interaction with the salesperson who sold you the 
product: 
 
Date of Purchase/Visit: ___/___/___ 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The salesperson approached me within a reasonable 
amount of time after I entered the store. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was careful to consider my specific 
furniture needs when suggesting a product. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was able to answer any questions I had 
concerning the product. 1 2 3 4 5 
I would feel comfortable dealing with this salesperson 
for a future purchase. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please provide any additional comments about your interaction with the salesperson and about 
how his/her service could be improved in the future. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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 Appendix E: Evaluation Materials – Mike Brown 
 
Appendix E1 
 
Sales Associate Evaluation 
2003 – Annual Evaluation 
 
Store #:  ______ 
Employee Name: Mike Brown  
Date Hired: Feb/02 
 
 
Product 
 
Cost 
Average Units 
Sold per 
Employee* 
Total 
Monetary 
Value 
Units Sold by 
This 
Employee 
Total 
Monetary 
Value 
Leather Sofa Set      
Couch $3,000 14 $42,000 11 $33,000
Recliner $990 17 16,830 18 $17,820
Ottoman $450 6 2,700 5 $2,250
Home Office   
Computer Desk $1,000 13 13,000 11 $11,000
Desk Chair $200 8 1,600 10 $2,000
Bookshelf $350 12 4,200 7 $2,450
Totals  70 $80,330 62 $68,520
   
 
*not including sales made by this employee 
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 Appendix E2 
 
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY – Mike Brown 
 
Our records show that you have purchased one of our products in the past month. We appreciate 
your business and welcome your comments regarding your experience with our staff.  Please 
answer the following questions regarding your interaction with the salesperson who sold you the 
product: 
 
Date of Purchase/Visit: ___/___/___ 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The salesperson approached me within a reasonable 
amount of time after I entered the store. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was careful to consider my specific 
furniture needs when suggesting a product. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was able to answer any questions I had 
concerning the product. 1 2 3 4 5 
I would feel comfortable dealing with this salesperson 
for a future purchase. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please provide any additional comments about your interaction with the salesperson and about 
how his/her service could be improved in the future. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY 
 
Our records show that you have purchased one of our products in the past month. We appreciate 
your business and welcome your comments regarding your experience with our staff.  Please 
answer the following questions regarding your interaction with the salesperson who sold you the 
product: 
 
Date of Purchase/Visit: ___/___/___ 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The salesperson approached me within a reasonable 
amount of time after I entered the store. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was careful to consider my specific 
furniture needs when suggesting a product. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was able to answer any questions I had 
concerning the product. 1 2 3 4 5 
I would feel comfortable dealing with this salesperson 
for a future purchase. 1 2 3 4 5 
 78
  
Please provide any additional comments about your interaction with the salesperson and about 
how his/her service could be improved in the future. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION SURVEY  
 
Our records show that you have purchased one of our products in the past month. We appreciate 
your business and welcome your comments regarding your experience with our staff.  Please 
answer the following questions regarding your interaction with the salesperson who sold you the 
product: 
 
Date of Purchase/Visit: ___/___/___ 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The salesperson approached me within a reasonable 
amount of time after I entered the store. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was careful to consider my specific 
furniture needs when suggesting a product. 1 2 3 4 5 
The salesperson was able to answer any questions I had 
concerning the product. 1 2 3 4 5 
I would feel comfortable dealing with this salesperson 
for a future purchase. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please provide any additional comments about your interaction with the salesperson and about 
how his/her service could be improved in the future. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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 Appendix F: Measures 
 
Performance 
 
1. Overall, this employee was effective.  (Slaughter et al., 2003) 
 
2. Overall, this employee contributed to the success of the team.  (Slaughter et al., 2003) 
 
3. Overall, this employee performed favorably.  (Slaughter et al., 2003) 
 
Promotability 
 
1. Likelihood of promoting this employee within the next year. 
 
2. Likelihood of this employee being promoted within the next year.  (Slaughter et al., 2003) 
 
3. During the next year, how likely is this employee to be promoted? 
 
Performance Improvement 
 
1. Likelihood of improving performance next year.  (Slaughter et al., 2003)   
 
2. How likely is this employee to improve his performance? 
 
3. Likelihood of this employee’s performance meeting the company’s standards in the next 
year. 
 
Pay Increase 
 
1. How large, if any, of a pay increase would you give this employee (i.e., how much would 
you increase his pay over the previous year’s salary)?  The company average is 10% 
annually.  (Bazerman et al., 1982; Citera et al., 1999; Slaughter et al., 2003) 
 
Vacation Days 
 
1. How many, if any, bonus vacation days in the upcoming year would you give to this 
employee?  0-4  (Bazerman et al., 1982; Citera et al., 1999; Slaughter et al., 2003) 
 
Likelihood of Probation 
 
1. If you were told to make a decision at this moment, would you put this employee on 
probation?  Yes/No  (Slaughter et al., 2003) 
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 Likelihood of Layoff 
 
2. If you were told to make a decision at this moment, would you fire this employee?  Yes/No  
(Slaughter et al., 2003) 
 
Commission Decrease 
 
3. How much, if any, would you lower this employee’s percentage of commissions? (1 = not at 
all to 7 = as much as possible) 
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 Appendix G: Demographic and Background Information 
 
What is your gender?  _____  Female ______  Male 
 
What is your age? _____  years 
 
What is (are) your major(s)?  _____________________________ 
 
How many full-time jobs (i.e., 30-40 hours per week) have you held (circle one)? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 or more 
 
How many part-time jobs have you held (circle one)? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 or more 
 
Are you currently employed full-time (i.e., 30 or more hours per week)?  _____  Yes  _____  No 
 
Are you currently employed part-time (i.e., less than 30 hours per week)?   
_____  Yes  _____  No 
 
If you are not currently employed full-time, when do you plan to begin full-time employment? 
 
_____  within the next 6 months          _____  within one year            _____more than one year 
from now 
 
Have you ever worked as part of a team?    Yes        No 
Have you ever held a managerial position?     Yes       No 
Have you ever had any experience evaluating an employee’s performance?     Yes       No 
Have you ever had any experience, formal or informal, with making hiring decisions?    Yes   No 
What factors did you consider when evaluating Dave’s (Mike’s) performance? 
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 Appendix H: Manipulation Checks 
 
Perspective 
 
1. Based on the scenarios you read, you were asked to assume which of the following working 
relationships with the person you evaluated? (a) Supervisor; (b) Team member”  (Slaughter 
et al., 2003) 
 
Responsibility 
 
1. Based on the scenarios you read, who was responsible for hiring the employee you 
evaluated?  (a) I was; (b) My group was; (c) Human Resources; (d) I don’t know 
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 Vita 
 
 The author was born in Naperville, Illinois, and moved to Texas when she was young.  
She attended the University of North Texas from 1994 to 1997.  Upon graduation with her 
Bachelor of Arts degree, she spent a few years working in Arizona and Texas before becoming a 
graduate student in Louisiana State University’s industrial-organizational psychology program.  
She is currently in her third year as a doctoral student and hopes to finish her doctorate in 2005. 
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